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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

**U.S. - EUROPEAN RELATIONS PRE- AND POST  
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

by

Thomas Lange

March 2002

Thesis Advisor:  
Associate Advisor:

Cary A. Simon  
William J. Haga

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**U.S. - EUROPEAN RELATIONS  
PRE- AND POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

Thomas Lange  
Lieutenant Commander, German Navy  
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT**

from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

Throughout the more than 50 years in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has secured peace and stability in Europe, relations between the U.S. and its European allies remain a persistent paradox - unified, yet at considerable odds. It is a partnership that is consistent and strong, yet troubled and fragile.

This thesis analyzes the emerging European-American relationships based on perceptions of key stakeholders, including pre- and post- September 11 attitudes, and persistent concerns. Although history may repeat itself, globalization of politics, finance and national security increasingly connect Europeans, Americans and other nations. The complexity of these relationships is studied to reveal common themes relevant to evolving European-American relations.

This study reveals the following findings: France, Germany and the United Kingdom represent the overall voice of European policies; The interpersonal relations between prominent European and American stakeholders appear more substantial and influential than publicly acknowledged; European stakeholders perceive the current U.S. administration as generally reflective of a bygone era; The number of European partners are increasing and European voices are moving tentatively closer to a common voice on foreign and security issues; And important European domestic issues appear to dominate European concerns, often overshadowing the American preoccupation on terrorism.



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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. PROBLEM**

One of the major problems within the transatlantic alliance has always been the lack of understanding for their respective partners that Europeans and Americans have continuously demonstrated. Despite the more than 50 years of close political and military cooperation, communication and collaboration between alliance members is often difficult and repeatedly suffers from mutual misunderstandings. Cultural and philosophical disagreements ultimately threaten the political and military security of the United States and a united Europe.

## **B. ANALYSIS**

This thesis presents an analysis of the historical background and respective development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). It focuses on the political approaches of the U.S. and Europe since 1947 and analyzes the psychology that lies beneath the actions taken, which more often than not have pulled the U.S.-European relationship further apart rather than uniting the transatlantic partners.

## **C. CONSEQUENCES**

If the American and European alliance members continue to follow their respective self-centered ideological paths rather than become true, respectful partners of one another the geo-strategic consequences could be dire. In light of the current fight against terrorism this could have a global ripple effect and de-stabilize other regions as well.

This thesis analyzes some of the possible consequences.

#### **D. BACKGROUND**

Since the inception of NATO in 1949, the European-American relationship has been under constant discussion, albeit more so in Europe than in the United States. Despite NATO's obvious success of securing peace and stability in Europe the alliance's internal relations have always been strained. Dealings among member nations were often influenced more by domestic policies than transatlantic issues; a change of government could sour the partnership or breath new life into it. Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, European and American politicians were drifting apart and argued heatedly over a number of issues. Europeans were disenchanted with America's obvious preoccupation with Asia and Latin America, the Bush administration's attitude towards the Kyoto protocol on global warming, the International Crime Court, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and other issues such as the trade wars, which caused irritation in U.S.-European relations (Walker, 2002). Thus, the "swift and heartfelt solidarity," the European allies extended towards the United States after the September attacks came as a valuable restorative to a faltering transatlantic relationship. Yet, only months later, the old differences and rifts appear to be surfacing again.

At a meeting in Cáceres, Spain, on February 8 - 9, 2002, the EU-foreign ministers criticized the Bush administration's "one-sided" Middle-East politics in favor of Israel as well as the branding of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil." Paris especially disapproved of the unilateral solo of the Americans in the anti-terror alliance. French Foreign Minister Védérine<sup>1</sup> accused the United States of a simplified worldview in foreign politics and of supporting the aggressive politics of Israel's Minister President Sharon<sup>2</sup> in the Palestinian conflict.

In a newspaper interview, German Foreign Minister Fischer<sup>3</sup> added that "the term of the axis of evil does not do much help and to initiate measures without conclusive proof only leads to lonely actions" (Scheerer, FAZ, 2002).

On the one hand, the Europeans observed the threats of the American administration towards Iraq with growing concern and felt like the overly dominating

---

<sup>1</sup> Védérine, Hubert - French Foreign Minister - 1997-today

<sup>2</sup> Sharon, Ariel - Israel Minister President - 2001-today

<sup>3</sup> Fischer, Joseph - German Foreign Minister - 1998-today

U.S. allies were treating them like they were children. On the other hand, Secretary of State Powell<sup>4</sup> urged the deviationists to "respect the principles of U.S. leadership, even if they would not like to follow" (Scheerer, FAZ, 2002).

The German foreign ministry is in search of a different approach to deal with global terror. During a meeting of the EU and the Organization of Islamic Countries in Istanbul on February 12, 2002, Fischer pleaded for a "culture of tolerance." While the Bush administration might editorializing belittle this approach, there are also critical voices in the U.S. who have expressed their disapproval of the solitary approach espoused by President Bush. Former Vice President Gore<sup>5</sup> underlined that under the Clinton<sup>6</sup> administration a global challenge such as this would have been solved following the motto: "Together with others if possible - alone if necessary." The observation among U.S. allies is that post September 11 the Bush administration seems to be turning this into "Alone if possible - together with others if necessary."

## **E. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the emerging European-American relationships based on perceptions of key stakeholders, including pre- and post-September 11 attitudes, and persistent concerns. Although history may repeat itself, globalization of politics, finance and national security increasingly connects Europeans, Americans and other nations. The complexity of these relationships is studied to reveal common themes relevant to evolving European-American relations.

## **F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The following research questions are addressed:

1. Who are the major stakeholders in the U.S.-NATO and European Union relationship? What is the emerging relationship between these key actors in NATO and in the Western European Union?

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<sup>4</sup> Powell, Colin - United States Secretary of State - 2001-today

<sup>5</sup> Gore, Al - Vice President of the United States - 1993-2001

<sup>6</sup> Clinton, William J. - U.S. President - 1993-2001

2. How do the European institutions and key actors perceive the role of the U.S. in NATO?
3. What are the advantages, disadvantages and emerging perceptions concerning the implementation of WEU forces in the EU?
4. What are the forces and trends affecting a U.S. NATO withdrawal from Europe?
5. What are the stakes of the various stakeholders concerning a U.S. NATO withdrawal from Europe?
6. What is the changing strategic interest of the U.S. in Europe?

## **G. METHODOLOGY**

An extensive literature review of books, magazines, and newspapers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States was conducted to ensure a comprehensive description of the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union, including the political circumstances and movements in Europe and the United States that influenced the relationship between them.

A semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix A) was used to tap European senior stakeholders' knowledge and perceptions concerning the European-American relationship and possible future development between the United States and European countries. Semi-structured interviews were intended to consolidate the findings and to receive further information of possible changes in the European-American relationship, which could have had considerable impact on this thesis.

A Content analysis, and Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis were used as strategic tools to diagnose and clarify the complex topic.

## **H. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS**

Chapter II outlines the research methodology used in the literature search, semi-structured questionnaires and interviews as well as the survey development and implementation. Chapter II also clarifies the structure and purpose of the written questionnaire. Furthermore, it details why some senior European stakeholders chose not to answer the questionnaires after the events of September 11, 2001.

Chapter III presents an overview of the historic background and development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). It also discusses the origins of both organizations from 1945-1949, their further development and roles during the Cold War and highlights the relationship of these organizations and their respective development after the end of the Cold War until the present day.

Chapter IV focuses on the European-American relationship from 1947 until 2001. This chapter outlines how the Americans, after World War II, influenced the decision making process that led to the founding of NATO in 1949. It highlights important developments throughout the over fifty years of the alliance's history emphasizing some of the pivotal events.

Chapter V lists all American troops stationed in Europe and explains the political, military and strategic purpose of these deployments. It also outlines recent as well as projected changes in the U.S. military global posture prompted by the September 11 attacks.

Chapter VI analyzes the data collected through semi-structured questionnaires and interviews with various European senior military and political stakeholders. It provides a detailed content analysis and a SWOT analysis based on their responses.

Chapter VII contains conclusions and recommendations generated from the study and summarizes the research questions. Areas for improvement are addressed as well.

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## **II. METHODOLOGY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of an extensive literature search and review of American, British, French and German books, newspaper articles, and an Internet search of American and European sources was conducted on the following:

The respective development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU); the European-American relationship from 1947 until 2001 to show which incidents and political circumstances led to misunderstandings or friction between the United States and European countries; and a review and Internet search of U.S. American installations, including their location and mission in Europe.

A semi-structured survey containing open ended questions (Appendix A) was sent to 30 senior stakeholders in European countries including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom, NATO and the WEU. These senior stakeholders are two and three star generals in high ranked positions of their respective countries, or in a high ranked position within NATO or the WEU. Confidentiality respondent identity and answers was promised in the hope that the replies would be frank and honest with no concern about potential political fallout. Nine useable surveys were returned and analyzed. An investigation on why the other contacted stakeholders did not reply led to the finding that the attacks of September 11, 2001 had an immense impact on the development of the relations between the United States and the European Union. None of the contacted official representatives wanted to comment on any official or unofficial position of their country, mainly based on a developing network of differing interests within NATO and potential emerging problems between the respective country and the United States that could be created by answering the questionnaire.



Six personal interviews were conducted by telephone with stakeholders to gain additional insights into their written responses. Three other stakeholders who did not receive a questionnaire were contacted by telephone and also interviewed.

Two strategic tools were applied to diagnose and clarify the complex topic:

1. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis
2. Content analysis

Three main themes were distilled from the questionnaires and telephone interviews. These were verified by responses supporting these themes. Finally these main themes were discussed in this thesis.

Based on the currency of the issues covered in this thesis and the changes involved in political decision processes, the majority of the research for this paper was completed on 1 January 2002. Events or decisions made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union, American or European players and stakeholders after 1 January 2002 are not included in the analysis and their effects were not considered.

## **B. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Literature dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union is abundant. Textbooks, articles, CD-Rom's and Internet web pages describing the organizational structure of NATO and WEU were read and cross-checked against other references for correlation of quotations, statements of fact and interpretation of meaning in various languages.

To ensure a comprehensive description of the development of the two organizations as well as the political circumstances and movements in Europe and the United States that influenced the relationship between them, books, magazines and newspapers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States were reviewed. Furthermore, an Internet research was conducted to collect current material concerning actual developments.

## **C. QUESTIONNAIRE**

A semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix A) was used to tap stakeholders' knowledge and perceptions concerning the European-American relationship and possible future development between the United States and the European countries.

The questionnaire was to be answered in two ways: Perception before the incidents of September 11, 2001 and after. This was supposed to probe possible changes in the European attitude towards America.

### **1. Questionnaire Development**

One source (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982) was used in developing the questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed by electronic mail to 30 senior officers in various European countries, NATO and the WEU. Of these, nine were returned and analyzed.

In developing the questionnaire, several key factors were considered. First, the respondents were informed in a covering letter about the motive of the study and that it was important to receive personal answers rather than to provide their countries' official point of view on European-American relationship. The participants were promised anonymity. No names or official functions of the respondents are identified in this thesis.

Another factor in developing the questionnaire involved the sequence of the questions. The questions were ordered in five major areas. First a country's relationship to the U.S., followed by European-American relationship in general. The third area covered the roles and stakeholders in Europe in general and the respondent's country in particular. The fourth area asked about the possible development of NATO and WEU from the participant's point of view. The questionnaire concludes with questions about the U.S. involvement in Europe. It asks about strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats if America were to reduce its military involvement in Europe. All questions were open-ended to give respondents an opportunity to elaborate their answers. Lastly, it was important to let the respondents know their effort and time spent on answering the questions was greatly appreciated.

A literature review (Chapters 3 and 4) about the development of NATO and the WEU as well as the relationship between the European countries and America informed the development of the questionnaire.

## **2. Questionnaire Distribution**

The questionnaire was distributed as an attachment to electronic mail to respondents from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom. These respondents were various military attachés, high ranking military (one, two and three star generals) at NATO headquarters or WEU headquarters in Brussels.

The events of September 11, 2001 and especially the following steps taken by NATO influenced some potential respondents not to answer.

## **D. INTERVIEWS**

The interviews were conducted after the deadline for the return of the questionnaire had passed. The interviews were intended to consolidate the findings and to receive further information of possible changes in the European-American relationship, which could have had considerable impact on this thesis. As already done in the questionnaire, a SWOT analysis (Bryson, 1995, p.82ff.) was conducted in the interviews. This tool allowed the researcher to ascertain internal strengths and weaknesses affecting the two organizations and the European-American relationship, as well as the external opportunities and threats facing the organization and the European-American relationship.

## **E. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS**

The first step taken was to identify the major stakeholders in Europe and the United States who affect the European-American relationships. Mitroff (1983) defines stakeholders as "all those parties who either affect or are affected by an organization's actions, behavior, and policies" (Mitroff, 1983, p.4). The purpose of the identification of the major stakeholders in the United States, but more importantly in Europe, was to

develop a picture of the key players in the European political theater and how they affect other European decision making processes. This purports to provide a better understanding of European decision processes, which sometimes oppose American interests.

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### **III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FROM 1947 UNTIL 2001**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Already in 1945 even the most persistent optimist could not claim that the international horizon was cloudless. The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, expressed his concerns in a telegram to the U.S. President Truman from May 12, 1945: "How will the position be in one or two years, when the British and American troops are melted away, the French troops are not considerably extended and the Soviets perhaps decide to maintain 200 or 300 active divisions?" And he added: "In front of Russia an iron curtain came down. We do not know, what takes place behind it ... " (NATO Information service, 1990, p.17).

This chapter explores the history of the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) from their beginning until the present and sets the stage for understanding the emerging relationship between U.S.-NATO and European Union stakeholders.

#### **B. ORIGINS OF WEU AND NATO 1945 - 1949**

Western European countries and their North American allies viewed with concern the expansionist policies and methods of the USSR. Having fulfilled their own wartime undertakings to reduce their defense establishment and to demobilize forces, Western governments became increasingly alarmed as it became clear that the Soviet leadership intended to maintain its own military forces at full strength (NATO Handbook, 1998-1999, p.25). The Soviet territorial expansion under the regime of Stalin had started already during World War II with the annexation of Estonia, Latvia as well as parts of Finland, Poland, Romania and eastern Czechoslovakia. After the defeat of Germany this territorial expansion was continued and found its completion with the politics of hegemony over the East European countries.

The text on which European security cooperation is founded is the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948. Signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, it provided for economic, social and cultural cooperation among these states, but above all it embodied a strong commitment to collective defense. It extended the defense pact created by the Dunkirk Treaty - concluded on March 4, 1947 between France and the United Kingdom - to the Benelux States (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, p.5).

In the aftermath of World War II, the concern of its signatories was to prevent German rearmament. At the first signs of the Cold War, the Prague coup in February 1948, the Western allies reassessed the realities of a Soviet threat. Two months after the Brussels Treaty was signed, the Berlin blockade began. In September 1948, a military organization was set up under the Brussels Treaty known as the "Western Union" or "Brussels Treaty Organization."

It was during this same period, that the five powers who had signed the Brussels Treaty, plus the United States and Canada, opened negotiations with a view to concluding a collective defense pact. The Atlantic alliance came into being when twelve countries<sup>7</sup> signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1949 (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, p.6). It was agreed that an armed attack against one of the signing countries would be considered as an attack against all, and that each party would then take such action as it deemed necessary, including the use of armed forces (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty). This formalized the commitment of the United States and Canada to contribute to the defense of Europe.

### **C. WEU AND NATO DURING THE COLD WAR 1950 - 1989**

After the raid of communist North Korea on the Western oriented South Korea in 1950, the idea of a European Army, in which soldiers of the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany were designated to participate, was born in Europe. This was meant to lead to United Armed Forces built from six European countries. On August 29<sup>th</sup>, 1954

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<sup>7</sup> Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States

the French National Assembly refused authorization to ratify the treaty, which led to a modification of the Brussels Treaty by the Paris Agreements of October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1954, which enabled Germany and Italy to join. The signatories of the Paris Agreement clearly stated their three main objectives in the preamble of the modified Brussels Treaty:

- To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery
- To afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression
- To promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe

From 1954 to 1973, the WEU played an important role by promoting the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic alliance. The WEU tried to support the restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibilities for arms control and worked on the settlement of the Saar problem.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, the WEU worked as a liaison between founding states<sup>9</sup> of the European Community and the United Kingdom. This role ended when the UK joined the European Community in 1973.

Between 1973 and 1984 the activities of the WEU in the European processes declined gradually. It retained its vitality and originality only by maintaining the political and institutional dialogue between the Council and the Assembly of the European Community. The WEU's social and cultural responsibilities had been transferred to the Council of Europe in 1960. When NATO was set up, it took over the WEU Council's more strictly military responsibilities (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, p.7).

While the WEU activities declined, the activities in NATO increased. In 1952, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grew for the first time since its inception when Greece and Turkey joined, and in 1955 Germany became the 15<sup>th</sup> member country of NATO.

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<sup>8</sup> The Saarland (German state bordering on France) was occupied by France and stood under special protection. The WEU integrated the Saarland back into Germany and organized the first elections for the parliament of the state.

<sup>9</sup> The European Union was established on the basis of the Treaty of Rome signed on March 25<sup>th</sup>, 1957 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands.



In 1966 the French government announced that it would withdraw all French military personnel from integrated military NATO staffs, end the subordination of French troops under international command and forced the international units, installations and military bases that were not under French command to leave France. This French decision made negotiations necessary to determine a special status for France within NATO, because the country remained a member of the political part of NATO. As a consequence NATO's headquarters were transferred from Fontainebleau, France to Brussels, Belgium.

1967 was a period of great change and great challenge for the alliance. Under the terms of Article 13 of the Washington Treaty, any party could leave the alliance once the Treaty itself had been in force for 20 years, and that date would be reached in early 1969. Therefore, at the time there was real concern that several countries, including perhaps the United States, might withdraw.

Concerned about the impact of these decisions on the alliance, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel<sup>10</sup> proposed that a study should be undertaken on the future tasks of the alliance, thereby emphasizing the goals, which lay ahead rather than the problems of the past. Known as the Harmel Report, its conclusions, adopted by the North Atlantic Council in December 1967, established a substantial program of work, including the task of seeking a more stable relationship with the East. Proposals for disarmament and practical arms control measures were to be formulated, including possible Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

NATO's Defense Planning Committee decided to adopt a revised strategic concept to replace the massive retaliation doctrine. The new strategy, called flexible response, was based on a balanced range of responses involving the use of conventional as well as nuclear weapons (NATO Office of Information and Press, CD-ROM, 2000).

In May 1972, the North Atlantic Council launched a new phase in East-West relations. During a meeting in Bonn, allied ministers agreed to begin multilateral talks in preparation for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Begun in

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<sup>10</sup> Harmel, Pierre - Belgian Foreign Minister - 1966-1972

Helsinki on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1973<sup>11</sup>, this conference ended in June 1973 with the agreement on a conference agenda divided into three chapters or "baskets:"

1. European security including confidence-building measures
2. Economic, scientific, technological, and environmental cooperation
3. Cooperation in the humanitarian field, including human contacts, information, culture, and education (NATO Office of Information and Press, CD-ROM, 2000).

The final phase took place in Helsinki from July 31<sup>st</sup> to August 1<sup>st</sup> and was attended by heads of state and government who signed the Final Act.

In June 1979, U.S. President Carter<sup>12</sup> and USSR General Secretary Brezhnev<sup>13</sup> signed the SALT II agreement in Vienna. Despite some progress in the field of arms control, the Soviet Union had continued to strengthen their forces, while defense spending and force levels of the NATO members had remained static. As early as 1977, U.S. President Carter had proposed that NATO allies should each increase defense spending by three per cent annually. Attempts were also made to get better value for money by ensuring the interoperability of defense equipment, whereby the allies' communications systems, fuel, ammunition and spare parts would be made compatible.

Many in the West argued that the continuing imbalance in the forces of the two sides could weaken both the stability, which had been achieved in inter-continental systems through the SALT process, as well as NATO's deterrent strategy.

These anxieties became more acute when the Soviet Union began the rapid deployment of the SS-20<sup>14</sup>, most of which were targeted on Western Europe.

By the time of a special meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers on 12 December 1979, some 130 SS-20 missiles with 390 warheads had been deployed. The

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<sup>11</sup> CSCE preparatory negotiations, with the participation of all European states except Albania, and with the United States and Canada

<sup>12</sup> Carter, Jimmy - U.S. President 1977-1981

<sup>13</sup> Brezhnev, Leonid - USSR Secretary General - 1964-1982

<sup>14</sup> Multiple warhead, intermediate-range nuclear missiles

Ministers adopted a "double-track" decision. NATO would deploy 572 US Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles in Europe, all with single warheads. But as modernization proceeded, 1,000 nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from Europe. In addition, and this was the second track, a broad set of initiatives would be launched to further the course of arms control and confidence-building so as to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe as a whole.

On May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1982 Spain became the 16<sup>th</sup> member to join the alliance. The NATO Council recorded this as an indication of the enduring vitality of an organization linking free countries, inspired by shared values of pluralistic democracy, individual liberty, human dignity, self-determination and the rule of law (NATO Office of Information and Press, Chronology, CD-ROM, 2000).

In January 1981, President Reagan<sup>15</sup> launched a substantial program to build up the military strength of the United States, arguing that arms control agreements could not be negotiated from a position of weakness.

The Europeans, who did not doubt the necessity of moves in that direction, felt some discomfort with President Reagan's rhetorical use in his infamous "Evil Empire" speech<sup>16</sup>, and they feared that a description of the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world" would only complicate East-West relations.

As the deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles approached, the public debate on the alliance's nuclear policy heated up and campaigns for nuclear disarmament became more vigorous.<sup>17</sup> NATO was suddenly faced with protest groups and large-scale demonstrations, which threatened the broad public support, NATO always had enjoyed. Furthermore, the SDI program was launched by the United States without consulting the Europeans, which led to discussions on the need for a European pillar within the alliance and the debate on European security.

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<sup>15</sup> Reagan, Ronald - U.S. President - 1981-1989

<sup>16</sup> "The Evil Empire," President Reagan's Speech to the House of Commons, June 8, 1982

<sup>17</sup> In particular in the countries where the missiles were to be based: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In addition, despite the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it was impossible for the Europeans to define a common security policy going beyond purely economic aspects.<sup>18</sup>

On the initiative of the Belgian and French governments, a joint meeting of the foreign and defense ministers was held in Rome on October 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>, 1984. They passed the "Rome Declaration," which marked the reactivation of the WEU, and stated two objectives:

1. Definition of a European Security Identity
2. Gradual harmonization of the defense policies of the WEU member states

In addition, the member states agreed to consult each other on:

- Defense questions
- Arms control and disarmament
- The effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance
- Development of European cooperation on armaments

In December 1987, U.S. President Reagan and the leader of the USSR, Gorbachev<sup>19</sup>, sign the INF Treaty in Washington<sup>20</sup>, which in European eyes highlighted the need for even closer European consultation on defense. The WEU council and its Special Work Group produced a report on European security conditions and criteria and on the specific responsibilities of Europeans for their defense within the Atlantic alliance and their role in promoting a dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries, especially in arms control. On this basis the WEU Ministerial Council met in The Hague to adopt a "Platform on European Security Interests"<sup>21</sup>. The Hague Platform also set out general

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<sup>18</sup> Due to the reluctance of Denmark, Greece and Ireland.

<sup>19</sup> Gorbachev, Mikhail - USSR Secretary General - 1985-1991

<sup>20</sup> The United States and the USSR agreed to eliminate all land-based intermediate and short-range missiles on both sides, as well as 670 deployed Soviet missiles and 440 deployed US missiles.

<sup>21</sup> October, 27<sup>th</sup> 1987

guidelines for WEU's future program of work. The preamble restated the twin motives for the reactivation of WEU: giving a security dimension to European integration and reinforcing the solidarity of the alliance (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, pp.8-9). It stated:

"We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced, that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense"

Paragraph 2 of the preamble to the "Hague Platform"

#### **D. WEU AND NATO RELATIONS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR 1990-2001**

A further step was taken in November 1989 when the Council of the WEU decided to create an Institute for Security Studies in Paris, which had the task to assist in developing a European Security Identity and the implementation of the Hague Platform. Following the ratification of the Treaty of Accession signed in November 1988, Portugal and Spain became members of the WEU in 1990.

During the First Gulf War<sup>22</sup> the WEU member states came together to react to the mining threat in the Persian Gulf to the freedom of navigation and decided to send out naval units to secure free movement in international waters. This "Operation Cleansweep" constituted the first example of a coordinated European operation in pursuance of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty<sup>23</sup>.

During the Second Gulf War<sup>24</sup>, the WEU again took over the coordination of the military presence of WEU member states in the Persian Gulf. WEU, by virtue of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the precedent set by the mine-clearing operation

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<sup>22</sup> 1987 - 1988 Iran - Iraq

<sup>23</sup> At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit, then to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

<sup>24</sup> Provoked by the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990

in 1988, built the framework for concerted actions by Europeans (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, p.9).

By the spring of 1990 the Warsaw Pact, which bound Eastern Europe to the will of the soviet leadership, began to disintegrate. The three Baltic States<sup>25</sup> embarked on the road to independence and East German citizens voted massively for the "Alliance for Germany," which was translated by the East German government into action by declaring itself in favor of unification of the two Germanys and thereafter the membership of all of Germany in the NATO alliance. In Hungary the first free elections were held and the borders between Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany were opened, which gave freedom to travel not only to the Czech citizens but also to their eastern neighbors.

With the domino progression of change in Europe's fifty-year old status quo, alliance foreign ministers seized the moment. In a little known declaration of immense symbolic significance, NATO's "Message from Turnberry"<sup>26</sup> extended the hand of cooperation and friendship to the Soviet Union and all other European countries.

On October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1990 the two Germanys were reunited and the most obvious symbol of the divided Cold War Europe had disappeared.

Early in 1991 the idea of strengthening the links between WEU, NATO and the European Community gained ground with the support of Jacques Delors<sup>27</sup> (President of the European Committee), Manfred Woerner<sup>28</sup> (NATO General Secretary) and Willem van Eekelen<sup>29</sup> (WEU Secretary General).

In November of the same year the NATO heads of state and government issued the new Strategic Concept. The "Rome Summit of Peace and Cooperation"<sup>30</sup> approved a new strategic concept of the alliance for the period after the East-West confrontations with the intention of streamlining NATO forces, arms reductions and reorganization of

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<sup>25</sup> Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia

<sup>26</sup> June, 8<sup>th</sup> 1990

<sup>27</sup> Delors, Jacques - President of the European Committee - 1985-1995

<sup>28</sup> Woerner, Manfred - NATO General Secretary - 1988-1994

<sup>29</sup> Eekelen, Willem van - WEU Secretary General - 1989-1994

<sup>30</sup> November 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>, 1991

NATO's Military Command Structure. The development of cooperation with other countries was another essential element of this new concept. The Rome Summit also announced the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum that during the following years would serve as focal point for the cooperation between NATO and its new partners.

Furthermore the role in defense and the European security identity was recognized. It can be summarized as follows:

- The exercise of growing responsibilities by European members is an essential factor in the renewal of the alliance
- Specific arrangements for the defense of Europe will help to reinforce the collective security of all the allies
- The adaptation of WEU and the alliance calls for absolute complementarity's between the two (WEU Press & Info Service, 1995, p.12).

At the European Community Summit in Maastricht<sup>31</sup>, the WEU member states adopted a "Declaration on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance." This declaration stated that WEU would be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. The member states had a twofold aim on their mind:

- Formulate a European defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role
- Promote the introduction of joint positions of its members into the alliance's consultation mechanisms

During this summit, the "Declaration on relations between WEU and other European States" was adopted as well. European Union members were invited to join the WEU or become observers. Others, non-WEU members but NATO members, were

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<sup>31</sup> December 9<sup>th</sup> - 10<sup>th</sup>, 1991

invited to become associated members to enable them to participate fully in WEU activities.<sup>32</sup>

In addition, it was decided that the seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat would be moved from London to Brussels, which became effective in 1993.

On June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1992, the foreign and defense ministers of WEU member states issued the "Petersberg Declaration" whose three parts set out the guideline for the organization's future development:

- Support for conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council
- Implementation of the "Maastricht Declaration" in order to promote WEU as defense component of the EU
- Enlargement of WEU

During the 1994 Brussels Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the "Partnership for Peace" initiative added new dimensions to the relationship between NATO and its partner countries. "Partnership for Peace" (PfP) is an initiative to enhance stability and security throughout Europe and addressed all participating states in the NACC and others in the CSCE who were willing to contribute to the program. Twenty-seven countries accepted the invitation.<sup>33</sup> All activities with each partner are based on individual Partnership Programs tailored to the respective country's specific needs. The program focuses on defense related cooperation, but is intended to go beyond dialogue and cooperation to create a real partnership.

Following objectives were formulated:

- Transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes
- Ensuring democratic control of defense forces

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<sup>32</sup> In 1992 Denmark and Ireland became observers. Iceland, Norway and Turkey became associated members of WEU.

<sup>33</sup> Rumania, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Albania, Chechnya, Moldavia, Slovenia, Azerbajdzan, Sweden, Finland, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Armenia, White-Russia, Austria, Malta



- Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and / or the responsibility of the CSCE
- The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed
- The development, over the long term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic alliance (NATO Handbook, 1995, p.267)

A few months later a Partnership Coordination Cell had been established at SHAPE<sup>34</sup>, NATO's senior military command headquarters in Europe, and offices for partner countries were opened at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

On May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1994 the WEU Council issued the "Kirchberg Declaration," which awarded the nine middle- and east European states the status of an associated partner. The "Kirchberg Declaration" therefore created a system of changeable geometry with three different layers of membership additional to the observer status:

- Members (all WEU members who are members of NATO and EU)<sup>35</sup>
- Associated Members (NATO - but not EU members)<sup>36</sup>
- Associated Partners (neither NATO nor EU member)<sup>37</sup>
- Observers (Members of NATO and/or EU)<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe

<sup>35</sup> Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain

<sup>36</sup> Norway, Turkey, Iceland

<sup>37</sup> Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland

<sup>38</sup> Denmark (Member of NATO and EU), Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden (Member of EU)

On November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1994 the WEU foreign and defense ministers met in Noordwijk, Netherlands. For the first time, the nine associated partner countries participated. In the "Declaration of Noordwijk," issued at the conclusion of the meeting, WEU ministers endorsed a policy document containing preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defense Policy (CEDP). It also stressed the intention of WEU ministers to continue to work in close association with the North American allies (NATO Handbook, 1995, p.202). Further aspects of the "Declaration of Noordwijk" were the cooperation with the associated partners and associated members, the cooperation between WEU and EU, the WEU support for the CSCE and the work of the Western European Armament Group (WEAG).

In Birmingham<sup>39</sup> the WEU foreign and defense ministers continued the discussion and work in view of the Atlantic alliance with the goal of putting the decisions of Brussels in 1994 into action. For the WEU it was decided that further developing steps had to be taken in view of:

- Closer institutional and operational relations to the EU
- Intensification of relations to NATO, to use the resources and abilities of the alliance for European operations within the scope on the Petersberg Declaration
- Achieve further progress in view of an European Security Architecture

This finally led to this announcement concerning WEU and NATO:

#### **I. WEU's operational development:**

7. Ministers emphasized the need to continue to develop WEU's operational capabilities. This remains a prerequisite for an effective and credible European defense capability to carry out the Petersberg tasks and remains a high priority during the next phase of WEU's work (WEU website, 2001).

#### **V. Relations with NATO:**

18. Ministers emphasized the need to develop and strengthen further WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance in order to develop WEU as a

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<sup>39</sup> May 7<sup>th</sup>, 1996

means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. Close practical cooperation between the two Organizations will be essential if WEU is to fulfill its operational potential. They took note with satisfaction of the conclusion of the Security Agreement between WEU and NATO. They welcomed the progress achieved within NATO on the CJTF concept and looked forward to continuing coordination between the two Organizations on its implementation. They also welcomed the growing contacts between the two Organizations, including the resumption of meetings between the Permanent Council and SACEUR, joint meetings on their respective Mediterranean dialogues and exchanges of information in the field of relations with Russia and Ukraine. They tasked the Permanent Council to pursue as a matter of urgency the implementation of the CJTF concept and the Security Agreement and to continue to develop operational links with NATO (WEU website, 2001).

Following the Brussels Summit meeting in January 1994, an important task was to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the framework of the NATO alliance. During a meeting of the NATO foreign and defense ministers in Berlin in June 1996<sup>40</sup>, an agreement was reached on steps to meet these requirements. One of the main objectives was to preserve the transatlantic link, based on:

- Full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies (Presse- Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1996, p.507)

The Allies approved the execution of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, coupled with a series of agreements, which enabled Europe to develop its own ESDI within NATO. The agreement further explained that:

The NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review (Frankenberger, 1996, p.3).

The American Secretary of State Christopher<sup>41</sup> stated after that agreement: "NATO is becoming stronger, NATO is becoming more flexible." The French Secretary

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<sup>40</sup> June 3<sup>rd</sup> - 4<sup>th</sup>, 1996

<sup>41</sup> Christopher, Warren - U.S. Secretary of State - 1993-1997

of State spoke of a "Great success for Europe", and added a less noticed sentence: "The European Security Identity will lead to the effect, that the United States of America will maintain their security political engagement in Europe (Frankenberger, 1996, p.3)."

The following year WEU stated in the "Declaration of the WEU on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" in Brussels<sup>42</sup> the objective "to build up WEU in stages as the defense component of the EU," as developed by the "Treaty of Amsterdam" (WEU website, WEU Documents, 2001). Thus, WEU's role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability was confirmed.

The internal and external adaptation of NATO was carried on in 1997 during the Summit Meeting in Madrid in July 1997. For the first time since the 1980's the alliance's heads of state and government invited countries to begin negotiations for a future membership in NATO. These were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland who signed the Washington Treaty in April 1999 in Washington and became the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth member of the North Atlantic alliance.

After becoming members of NATO the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland their roles in the WEU changed as well and they were welcomed as Associated Members during the WEU Ministerial Council in Bremen<sup>43</sup>, Germany.

During the WEU Council of Minister Meeting in Marseille<sup>44</sup>, France, the following statement concerning WEU-EU relations and cooperation was passed:

Ministers approved the WEU residual functions and structures, which will be in place by 1 July 2001 at the latest and will enable the Member States to fulfill the commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly those arising from Articles V and IX, to which the Member States reaffirm their attachment. Ministers requested that the necessary administrative and accommodation measures now be taken, to ensure that the residual WEU structures are in place when the EU becomes operational (WEU website, WEU documents, 2001).

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<sup>42</sup> July 22nd, 1997

<sup>43</sup> May 10<sup>th</sup> - 11<sup>th</sup>, 1999

<sup>44</sup> November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2000

This statement underlined the fact that the WEU would enter into the EU on July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2001.

## **IV. EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS FROM 1947 UNTIL 2001**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Since the end of World War II, Americans as well as Europeans have repeatedly stressed the importance of their close political and military relationship. Yet, even at its best times this relationship inside and outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has shown strains and tensions. Interests tend to be diverse and more often than not domestic issues influence the Atlantic decision-making process. For more than 50 years the United States' foreign policy has been based on the theory that preserving the security of Europe is a permanent and vital interest. In turn, the allies in Europe recognize that their security is inextricably tied to that of North America.

However, security in and for Europe is not a permanent condition, it is a challenge, which is put to the test over and over again (Weisser, 2000, p.15). The transatlantic institutional structure can be interpreted as two mutually interlocked consecutive post-war orders: One American and the other European or, to be more precise, French.

### **B. THE BEGINNINGS**

The United States' influence on the process of European integration was ambivalent. While on the one hand they played the role of a midwife at the birth of the European Community, they on the other hand set distinct borders, be it simply through their existence (Dembinski, 1999, p.20).

Until 1948, the concept that with the help of the United States, Western Europe could be built into an independent, even military autonomous third power was dominant within the U.S. (Mai, 1988, pp. 327-364).

In the winter of 1948 British Foreign Minister Bevin<sup>45</sup> and France's Bidault<sup>46</sup> had

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<sup>45</sup> Bevin, Ernest - British Foreign Secretary - 1945-1951

<sup>46</sup> Bidault, Georges - French Minister of Foreign Affairs - 1944-1946, 1947-1948, 1953-1954

reason to hope that America's responses to the crises in Prague<sup>47</sup> and Berlin<sup>48</sup>, along with potential trouble in the forthcoming elections in Italy as well as Soviet intimidation of Norway would induce the United States to embrace the Western Union<sup>49</sup>. However, the United States ruled out a membership in the Western Union, considering this organization too narrow to join (Kaplan, 1999, p.8).

In the eyes of the United States, a larger "Atlantic" organization would have to be devised in order to protect other countries in danger of communist undermining or attack such as Greece, Turkey and Italy. Even Spain and Germany, which in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 had been named as a potential enemy, came under consideration of this possible threat.

When the American administration rejected the addition of Title VI to the Congress Foreign Assistance Act, which would have made military assistance an important part of the U.S. foreign aid package, the Western European leaders were frustrated but "demonstrated their resolve to work together to overcome the reluctance of the United States to participate in the nascent European security arrangements" (WEU homepage, About Western European Union, 2001). In their conceptual phase, the European leaders hoped that the United States would join the Western Union. In their opinion, the Western Union would have had no meaning without U.S. participation. They were aware of the fact that neither the economic nor the military resources of Europe were sufficient to cope with a Soviet threat.

They saw no solution other than a permanent U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, which came in April 1949 when ten West European countries<sup>50</sup> and the United States and Canada signed the Washington Treaty, which created NATO. As a consequence the WEU transferred most of its functions to the newly established NATO.

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<sup>47</sup> Prague coup in February 1948

<sup>48</sup> Berlin Blockade 1948

<sup>49</sup> Brussels Treaty of March 17th, 1948 signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Great Britain, Predecessor of the Western European Union

<sup>50</sup> Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom

From then on, Europe deferred the responsibility of its own defense to the United States and the Atlantic alliance (Andréani et al, 2001, p.17).

The inclusion of Italy in NATO, which came as a result of an American concern that Italy was still vulnerable to communist subversion and that its membership would strengthen France's flank, was met with little enthusiasm on the part of the other Western Union members. However, the Italian membership required a concession to France - the inclusion of Algerian departments - before France would agree to Italy's membership (Kaplan, 1999, p.13).

The linking of the two continents through NATO did not guarantee satisfaction with every aspect of the alliance as far as the Europeans were concerned. The most serious diversion between Europe and America in the first year of the alliance's existence developed over defense plans devised earlier by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would effectively abandon Europe in the first phase of a war. The plan placed the defense line at the Rhine, but the Dutch were concerned about a defense plan that put the right bank of the Rhine outside of NATO's protection (Kaplan, 1999, p.54). A solution was to move the defense line at least to the river Elbe, which in turn meant Germany would have to be incorporated into NATO. Secretly the American Congress supported that idea and voices were raised on behalf of a German contribution, if not membership, to the defense of Europe against communism, yet in Europe the memory of World War II was still too vivid to accept this idea.

### **C. THE FIRST DECADE**

The Korean War (1950-1953) dramatically changed the relationship between Germany and the Western Allies. Initially, the Europeans feared that the war in the Far East would divert America's attention from Europe and lead to the abandonment of the Atlantic alliance, but Truman's response was reassuring to the Europeans. He emphasized that the Americans wanted to avoid a situation similar to the one experienced in Korea. They feared a possible assault by East German paramilitary troops backed by twenty-seven Soviet divisions stationed in the eastern zone of Western Germany, which stood under the protectorate of the western allies, mainly the United States. In light of this, the



U.S. demanded a reorganization of NATO and the incorporation of Western Germany. This led to tensions with France. The French proposed the Pleven<sup>51</sup> Plan, which called for the creation of a European force under a European minister of defense. They hoped that herewith concerns about a re-militarized Germany could be eliminated since the control of the German contribution would be in the hands of the Europeans. Yet, in 1954, the French National Assembly voted against their own plans, because they were reluctant to include their own military in a European army, fearing a loss of control over their own troops. After the plan for a European army faltered, Germany was finally welcomed into NATO as a full-fledged member in 1955.

In NATO's first decade, the European allies were torn between gratitude for the shelter of American power and resentment over their dependence on that power (Kaplan, 1999, p.62). There were the French with their anger about the United States abandonment of French interests in Indochina, and their irritation over the replacement of a French-friendly Vietnamese government with one closely tied to the Americans. Secondly, the United Kingdom felt ignored by the American refusal to put the Mediterranean command under British control. Thirdly, the nuclear strategy of America played an important role for the Germans. Concerns grew especially after the NATO maneuver "Carte Blanche" in June 1955, which took place in Great Britain, France, the Benelux countries and Germany. During this exercise 12,000 sorties were flown and 335 atomic bomb jettisons were simulated. The German press projected that in this planned scenario the death or injured toll in Germany alone would have been at least five million people (Schoellgen, 1996, p.130). In addition, the so-called "Radford-Plan<sup>52</sup>", which suggested reducing the troops stationed in Europe by nearly 30 percent and increased the strategic nuclear potential, was published in the New York Times (New York Times, 1956, p.1). Following the reasoning of the "massive retaliation strategy" and the "Sword-Shield-Concept", the conventional forces of NATO in Europe would have served as a shield against local invasions, a massive attack of Soviet forces, even conventional, would have been counteracted with the nuclear sword of the United States. This led to intense

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<sup>51</sup> Pleven, René - French Minister President - 1950-1952

<sup>52</sup> Radford, Arthur W., Admiral - Chair, Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff

discussions within Germany whether the country should be armed with atomic weapons as well.

Britain and France openly exhibited their distrust of the United States in their Suez intervention in 1956 when they collaborated in an assault against Nasser's<sup>53</sup> Egypt without notifying their American partners (Kaplan, 1999, p.63). Eight days after the first airborne landed, the operation was halted under a ceasefire ostensibly ordered by the United Nations, which was in fact dictated by the Americans (Guardian Unlimited, 1999).

#### **D. THE KENNEDY ERA**

In Europe, the Kennedy<sup>54</sup> administration's activities and statements were perceived with skeptical nervousness, especially in Germany. During his 1961 "State of the Union Address" Kennedy did not mention the Berlin problem. Kennedy's political aims differed from those of his predecessors in that he was interested in a balance in Europe merely based on a status quo. This meant the abandonment of the formerly promoted policy of overcoming the partition of Germany and Berlin.

While the NATO doctrine MC 14/2 (massive retaliation) had still been in place at the end of the Eisenhower<sup>55</sup> era, the Kennedy administration felt that this doctrine was not viable and insisted on revitalizing a conventional defense strategy. The Europeans perceived both approaches negatively. On one hand, increased conventional defense forces meant higher costs, and on the other hand, they doubted the effectiveness of conventional forces against the superior number of Soviet forces. The idea of abandoning the massive retaliation approach was perceived by the Europeans as withdrawing the American protective shield that had guarded them for 15 years. Furthermore, the Americans were dissatisfied with how the defense burden in Europe was shared among NATO members. At a meeting in October 1957 with NATO Secretary General Spaak<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Nasser, Gamal Abdel - Egyptian President - 1952-1967

<sup>54</sup> Kennedy, John F. - U.S. President - 1961-1963

<sup>55</sup> Eisenhower, Dwight D. - U.S. President - 1952-1960

<sup>56</sup> Spaak, Paul-Henri - Secretary General of NATO - 1956-1961

and Secretary of State Rusk<sup>57</sup> had already expressed concerns over the increase of the U.S. share of NATO forces. They demanded that this trend had to stop. The Europeans counter complained that the United States had undercut its promise of support by reducing its troop strength in Europe (Kaplan, 1999, p.73).

Especially the French were suspicious of American pressure for "flexible response" and saw a build-up of conventional forces as evidence of a weakening of America's commitment to the defense of Europe. French President de Gaulle<sup>58</sup> and France feared that the U.S. would use this new policy to abandon Europe and France in the face of a Soviet attack.

It was a debate between two major figures - de Gaulle and American Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>59</sup> (Kaplan, 1999, p.99). De Gaulle believed that the U.S. was unreliable when it came to the defense of France. He used this belief as motivation and justification for French nuclear weapon testing and development. During a speech at the Ecole Militaire (French Military Academy) in Paris, in November 1959, de Gaulle challenged the dependency on America on the grounds that France's defense had to be French ("Il faut que la defense de la France soit francaise," de Gaulle, 1959). The French had tested their first atomic bomb in 1960, which prepared the path for their own, independent atomic power, the "Force de Frappe." This stood in direct opposition to the American plans to create a fourth power<sup>60</sup>, the NATO atomic power. During the Ministerial Session of the NATO Council held in Athens, Greece in early May of 1962 U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara informed the NATO members about the changed nuclear strategy of the United States. He spoke of a "nuclear shield" that was meant to deter the Soviets from using their atomic weapons and a "conventional sword", which would be used to fight a possible war. With this announcement he "forced" the Europeans to be content with their conventional role in the Atlantic defense. In response de Gaulle withdrew his country's naval forces from NATO.

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<sup>57</sup> Rusk, Dean - U.S. Secretary of State - 1961-1969

<sup>58</sup> de Gaulle, Charles - French President - 1958-1969

<sup>59</sup> McNamara, Robert S. - U.S. Secretary of Defense - 1961-1968

<sup>60</sup> The three powers at this time were: United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain

In the same year, Great Britain also had difficulties with the United States based on the sudden discontinuance of the Skybolt program, an air to surface missile intended to serve Britain's bomber fleet. McNamara decided that Skybolt was too expensive, not accurate enough, and would exceed its development time (Secretary of Defense, website). As compensation, America and Great Britain came to an agreement on the delivery of American Polaris missiles for the British submarine fleet. De Gaulle was not invited to a meeting between the British Prime Minister Macmillan<sup>61</sup> and U.S. President Kennedy in Nassau, Bahamas, where the final decision in this matter was made. Adding insult to injury, de Gaulle received the final communiqué of this meeting by mail, combined with a request to participate in this Anglo-American agreement. France rejected this invitation. At a press conference on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1963 de Gaulle announced that, in the French opinion, British politics had developed a different orientation than that of the other Europeans. He also stated, that "the single handed activity of Britain and America had annoyed him" (Schoellgen, 1996, p.190). On the same day, he vetoed the British entry to the European Economic Council (EEC), which had been under negotiation for more than two years. On March 7<sup>th</sup>, 1966 France underlined its irreconcilable differences with America and announced its decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military commands.

## **E. THE SIXTIES**

Because of its involvement in the Vietnam War, the Johnson<sup>62</sup> administration was faced with growing domestic anger against a Europe that did not sufficiently support the United States defense of South Korea (Kaplan, 1999, p.122). The Europeans were intensely critical of U.S. foreign politics at the time. After France had officially recognized the Peoples Republic of China in 1964<sup>63</sup>, de Gaulle traveled to Cambodia in the same year to openly attack the American conduct of war in South-East Asia. He publicly demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops and called upon the U.S. government to accept the North-Vietnamese conditions to end the war.

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<sup>61</sup> Macmillan, Harold - British Prime Minister - 1957-1963

<sup>62</sup> Johnson, Lyndon B. - U.S. President - 1963-1969

<sup>63</sup> France officially recognized the Peoples Republic of China on January 27<sup>th</sup>, 1964

America's most important ally, the British Labour government under Prime Minister Wilson<sup>64</sup>, also disassociated itself from American politics and conduct of war in the years 1964 to 1970.

As a result of these developments, a total of 15,000 American soldiers were withdrawn from Europe in 1966. In August of the same year, the Republican Party leader in the U.S. Senate demanded a drastic reduction of U.S. troops in Europe without requesting a reduction of Soviet forces at the same time. This suggestion was in direct contrast to the new doctrine of "flexible response", which was based on maintaining a balance of conventional forces in Europe on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The 1966 U.S. Senate's resolution of troop reduction in Europe and burden sharing within NATO, which was to continue for the next few years, was a direct U.S. response to the perceived European indifference and hostility to America's problems in Southeast Asia.

The French and their opposition to America received sympathy from many of the other allies in NATO. Europeans agreed that America was sluggish in helping the organization to adjust to new circumstances and that it had exploited NATO for its own imperial purposes. Portugal, for example, increasingly upset with the allies' lack of sympathy for its colonial problems, used de Gaulle's attack on NATO to express its own frustrations with American leadership of the alliance (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 129-130).

Further concerns regarding the alliance's stability emerged as the United Kingdom, under mounting financial pressure, sought to reduce its troop strength in West Germany in the summer of 1966 unless it were to obtain a commitment from the German government to offset these costs. Although less acute, the U.S. balance-of-payments problems translated to similar demands on the Germans. Trilateral offset discussions began late in 1966 as the Americans, British, and Germans focused on what reimbursement the Federal Republic would make to the United States and the United Kingdom for the maintenance of their forces in Germany (Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Vol. XIII). At the time, the U.S. deficit in balance of payments was blamed directly on the mounting costs of the country's involvement in Europe.

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<sup>64</sup> Wilson, Harold - British Prime Minister - 1964-1970

The new German government, a Social democrat and Christian-democrat coalition in power since 1966, was not afraid of openly criticizing the American government. Chancellor Kiesinger<sup>65</sup> assessed on February 27<sup>th</sup>, 1967 that "it can not continue like this anymore."

We are exclusively talking about controversial issues. We do not talk about common policies anymore ... Of course, we know that the American policy in Europe exclusively represents American interests. Sometimes there are Germans who think that there is friendship or a good turn. Afterwards there is always a big disappointment. In politics, only the interests between the nations rule. The American policy therefore follows American interests. The task is to determine, how far the American interests correspond with ours, the German and the European, how far not or not anymore.

(Kiesinger, 1967)

## **F. THE NIXON ERA**

Some American politicians agreed with the German perspective, at least in part. In a radio address in October 1968 the U.S. presidential candidate Nixon<sup>66</sup> criticized the Johnson administration for ignoring NATO and the transatlantic link. He stressed, that, "it's time we began paying Europe more attention. And if our ideals of Atlantic interdependence are to mean anything in practice, it's time we began lecturing our European partners less and listening to them more" (Nixon, 1968).

Taking office in January of 1969, Nixon underlined his intentions and introduced a new direction in American foreign policy: the Nixon Doctrine. Although the message was primarily intended for Asia, NATO was inevitably touched by it. When U.S. Senator Mansfield<sup>67</sup> proposed a resolution in the Senate for "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe," the Nixon administration held firm. They stated that the United States would not reduce its forces unless reciprocal actions were taken by the Soviet Union. Nixon did not even interfere with Germany when social-democratic Chancellor Brandt<sup>68</sup> started his so-called "Ostpolitik," a series of talks with the Soviet

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<sup>65</sup> Kiesinger, Kurt Georg - German Chancellor - 1966-1969

<sup>66</sup> Nixon, Richard M. - U.S. President - 1969-1974

<sup>67</sup> Mansfield, U.S. Senator, Republican, Montana

<sup>68</sup> Brandt, Willy - German Chancellor - 1969-1974

Union to improve the relationship between the two countries. This directly related to Nixon and Kissinger's<sup>69</sup> point of abstention from internal European affairs. Nixon and Kissinger had their own vision regarding the American-Soviet relations, which culminated in the détente with the Soviet Union. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Europeans had valued this attempt, but in the light of the U.S. retreat from Vietnam, it became an object of suspicion. To many Europeans, a bilateral détente with the Soviet Union seemed to be a consequence of the downscaling of America's commitment abroad, which would include Europe and Asia (Kaplan, 1999, p.153). They were concerned that in order to build the new "structure of peace," Americans might sacrifice the interests of the European allies (Kaltfleiter, 1973, p.94).

In August 1971, the European-American relationship reached a new low point caused by the "Nixon-shock." The United States introduced a 10 percent import tax and Washington's traditional principle of free economy took a beating. In addition to this, the liability to maintain the official dollar credit in gold reserves was annulled. With this move the monetary system of Bretton Wood<sup>70</sup>, which had been in place since 1944, came to an end. At the name giving conference in the U.S. state of New Hampshire, representatives from 44 nations had passed several resolutions, including the foundation of the "International Bank of Reconstruction and Development," the "World Bank" and the "International Monetary Fund" (IMF). The main goal of the IMF was a well-balanced growth of the world trade. In addition to this, the representatives of Bretton Wood agreed on fixing their national currency and the exchange rate on the reserve media gold or the US dollar. Also, IMF members agreed on holding the currency fluctuation with a parity of +/- 1 percent. After Nixon's announcement to cancel the Dollar credit - gold reserve liability, the basis of the Bretton Wood agreements was ultimately invalid.

Yet, this did not come as a complete surprise. The end of Bretton Wood had been in the air for quite some time, and there had been several indications previous to Nixon's decision. One was Germany's move to readjust its currency by +4.76 percent to counteract inflation imports in 1961. Another hint came in 1967 when the British pound was adjusted downwards. Despite these early indications, the Europeans felt snubbed

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<sup>69</sup> Kissinger, Henry A. - U.S. Secretary of State - 1973-1977

<sup>70</sup> Monetary system of Bretton Wood - July 1<sup>st</sup> - July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1944

once again, when the final decision was announced. To them it was just another sign of the "imperial style" of the American foreign, security and also economic policy. After all, they argued, these new measures would affect the partners of the USA, who had not been consulted in advance (Schoellgen, 1996, p.264).

In December 1971, the representatives of the ten most important industrial countries<sup>71</sup> tried to save Bretton Wood with the "Smithsonian Agreement." The currency exchange parity was newly defined and the bandwidth was expanded from +/- 1 percent to 2.25 percent. Actually, no one was surprised when this attempt failed in March 1973 and the system of stable currency exchange rates, especially between the United States and the European Community, was abandoned. Since this development had been quite foreseeable, the Europeans had already in March of 1972 decided on an increased coordination of their currency policy. This was meant to improve inner-European relations. Yet, this network developed difficulties, which tainted the positive record of European integration.

The Euro-Atlantic relations remained strained as before. Four years of the Nixon doctrine had left Europeans as suspicious of American policy in 1973 as they had been in 1969 (Kaplan, 1999, p. 155).

On Easter Monday 1973,<sup>72</sup> Kissinger clarified the power structure within the western world or, more precisely, a clear establishment of the American leadership role. The reason for his "Easter message" was the beginning of the "European Year." Nixon had declared the celebration of the "European Year" without mentioning or informing the European governments beforehand. In his speech Kissinger proposed a new "Atlantic Charter" using phrases such as "fresh act of creation" or "a revitalized Atlantic partnership" alluding to a document<sup>73</sup> signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, which was the basis for the United Nations (Kaplan, 1999, p.155). But other than these references, the Easter address of the American Secretary of State did not emphasize the equality of all

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<sup>71</sup> The Bretton Wood agreement was signed by: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States

<sup>72</sup> April 23rd, 1973

<sup>73</sup> The Inter-Allied Declaration signed in London 12 June 1941. The main goal of this declaration, "to work together, with other free peoples, both in war and in peace" was a first step towards the establishment of the United Nations.



partners. The main message was that the United States had global interests and responsibilities, while the European allies had only regional interests. It was a request to the Europeans, who just began to reorganize themselves after the financial debacle, to accept American leadership and fit into the American world power concept. German Chancellor Brandt concluded that these "unreasonable American demands" would only lead to a faster Europeanization of Europe (Brandt, 1975, p.459). The European reaction found its way into the 1973 draft of the declaration of the American-European relationship written by the foreign ministers of the European Community. Here, the Europeans demanded that the world political independence of the old continent should be acknowledged. Just a few days later the Americans presented their own draft, which made clear that the original intentions of the Nixon administration could not have been maintained. Nevertheless, this document left no doubt about the American claims to leadership. The repeated reference that NATO will be the central basis of the European-American relations was clear and not easy to refuse (Schoellgen, 1996, p.298).

In the end, the European allies felt obliged to give lip service to American thinking. Instead of Kissinger's new Atlantic Charter they accepted a "declaration of Atlantic principles" (Kaplan, 1999, p.157).

The following months showed that the transatlantic problems were not limited to security issues. Washington was interested in getting Europe on a common ground regarding the oil and energy crisis of the winter of 1973/1974, which was partially achieved at the Washington energy conference<sup>74</sup>. The participating countries agreed on consultations with the oil exporting countries. A coordination committee was appointed. While Germany and the United States stood up for a united line of action, the French tried to counteract American stage directions with a Euro-Arabic dialogue against America. This attempt ultimately failed, but left the Americans discontented.

During a "Question and Answer Session" in Chicago held briefly after the energy conference, President Nixon gave the following assessment of the European-American relationship:

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<sup>74</sup> Washington Energy Conference, February 11<sup>th</sup> - 13<sup>th</sup>, 1974, participants: USA, EU countries, Japan, Canada and Norway

The Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot have the United States participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front.... It is a time when the Europeans as well as we must sit down and determine that we are either going to go along together on both the security and the economic and political front or we will go separately. (Nixon Foundation, Website)

At the time, not even official NATO publications glossed over the strained partnership. In its twenty-fifth anniversary issue the NATO Review included an essay entitled "Twenty-five Years of Ups and Downs" (NATO Review, 1974).

## **G. THE EIGHTIES**

The next crisis in the European-American relations, especially between Americans and Germans, arose during the Carter administration. Even before his election, Carter<sup>75</sup> had signaled to German Chancellor Schmidt<sup>76</sup> that he would stop the delivery of a German-made nuclear power station to Brazil, a contract, which had long been agreed upon between Germany and Brazil. Although he could not follow through on his threat once he was in office, the relationship between the U.S. and Germany reached a new low-point and could best be described as "chilly." German social-democratic Chancellor Schmidt described the atmosphere at that time as follows:

Carter's concept of the superiority of his moral position and his overestimation of ability to form international politics, combined with Brzezinski's<sup>77</sup> tendency, as a representative of the world power to ignore or overrule the German interests without any consideration, had not been seen in the relationship between Washington and Bonn since Johnson's relations with Erhardt<sup>78</sup> (Helmut Schmidt, 1987, pp. 215 and 229).

As often with the politics of the Western allies, the deterioration of the German-American relationship had a positive turn. Once again, the German-American rivalry led to a strengthening of the inner-European identity, especially between France and

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<sup>75</sup> Carter, James E. - U.S. President - 1977-1981

<sup>76</sup> Schmidt, Helmut - German Chancellor - 1974-1982

<sup>77</sup> Brzezinski, Zbigniew - National Security Advisor to the President of the United States - 1977-1981

<sup>78</sup> Erhardt, Ludwig - German Chancellor - 1963-1966

Germany. Thus united, German Chancellor Schmidt and French President d'Estaing<sup>79</sup> gave several important impulses for new forms of international economic crisis management. Especially the 1975 meeting at Rambouillet<sup>80</sup>, which marked the first world economy summit, is worth noting.

The foreign policies of the Carter administration frustrated its European partners. As a result of the SALT II negotiations, which had begun under Secretary of State Kissinger in 1972 and were concluded by Secretary of State Vance<sup>81</sup> in 1978, the cruise missile was considered to be a strategic weapon and, consequently, would have to be removed from U.S. arsenals in Europe. At the same time President Carter ruled against deployment of the neutron bomb as an immoral move that valued property over people (Kaplan, 1999, p. 117)

As early as October 1977, German Chancellor Schmidt mentioned the imbalance that would be caused by signing the SALT II agreements. In his speech at the "International Institute for Strategic Studies" in London he pointed out that the neutralization of strategic nuclear potentials, which was the goal of SALT II, would lead to a disparity of military power in the field of nuclear and conventional forces. Many in the West argued that the continuing imbalance of forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain could undermine the stability, which had been achieved with regard to inter-continental systems through the SALT-process, as well as NATO's deterrent strategy (NATO Office of Information and Press, Chronology, CD-ROM, 2000).

The Europeans insisted on including the intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the SALT agreements and made those the subject of a projected third SALT negotiation, which never materialized. The anxieties became more acute when the Soviet Union began a rapid deployment of its SS-20, multiple warheads, intermediate-range nuclear missiles, most of which targeted Western Europe. The nuclear potentials of the French and British were not considered a counterforce. Finally, at a special NATO meeting on December 12<sup>th</sup>, 1979, foreign and defense ministers adopted the "NATO double-track" decision. The first track was that NATO deployed 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise

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<sup>79</sup> d'Estaing, Valéry-Giscard - French President - 1974-1981

<sup>80</sup> November 15<sup>th</sup> - 17<sup>th</sup>, 1975

<sup>81</sup> Vance, Cyrus R. - U.S. Secretary of State - 1977-1980

missiles, all with single warheads throughout Europe. With proceeding modernization approximately 1,000 warheads would be withdrawn from Europe and a broad set of initiatives would be launched in view of arms control and confidence building measures to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe. The main goal of this initiative was to avoid that in the wake of the SALT II treaty the United States could withdraw from its European partners (Schoellgen, 1996, p.365).

Especially in Germany, where most of these weapon systems were to be stationed, this double-track decision led to protests, and one German newspaper headlined: "NATO double-track: A new cold war?" (Bild, 1979, p.1). At the same time, America reacted to the double crisis in Afghanistan and Iran with sanctions against the Soviet Union and expected the allied support. Germany voiced its reservations about the boycotts against the Soviet Union in order to avoid any setback in their own policy of détente with the USSR.

Germany's actions at the time were interpreted in the United States as straying from American guidelines. Generally, the U.S. allies had difficulty understanding the German protests, which included prominent ministers of the same party as the Chancellor.

## **H. THE REAGAN YEARS**

When the Alliance decided on more weapons in Europe with its 1983 double-track solution it did not anticipate the American military buildup under President Reagan. Europeans, who were opposed to increasing armament in Europe, distrusted the new American president from the beginning, mainly because of his anti-Soviet course. To his critics, he was the embodiment of the Cold War at its worst (Schoellgen, 1996, p.373). The harsh rhetoric of his "Evil Empire" speech and increased U.S. defense expenditures brought no comfort to Europeans, who were concerned about an intensification of the Cold War and a possible complication of the East-West relations.

In 1983, the Reagan administration gave a new spin to the East-West conflict.

"My fellow Americans, tonight we are launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history" (Reagan, 1983).

With these words President Reagan announced his intentions to build a ballistic missile defense system capable of eliminating enemy nuclear missiles. This system was to be developed through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which soon became known as "Star Wars" (Commemorative Intelligence Agency, website). The realization of an American space monopoly led to a serious discussion within the Western European Union about creating a military space arm under the guidance of the civilian European Space Agency. In Britain, historically the closest U.S. ally in Western Europe, Foreign Secretary Howe<sup>82</sup> argued in a speech on March 15, 1985 that "there would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot<sup>83</sup> line of the twenty-first century, liable to be outflanked by relatively simpler and demonstrably cheaper countermeasures... The allies must ask whether the enormous funds to be devoted to such systems might be better employed on other forms of deterrence" (de Montbrial, 1986, p.510). President Mitterand<sup>84</sup> and Chancellor Kohl<sup>85</sup> believed that a small-scale EDI (European Defense Initiative), set-up to deal with a tactical rather than strategic nuclear threat, could be a viable proposition, but its realization was more likely once a united European state existed. In his policy statement of April 1985 Chancellor Kohl supported the American SDI initiative, but remained vague about his decision on a German participation (Deutsches Historisches Museum, website). Only a few weeks after the American proposal to the Europeans in March 1985 to join the research and development of SDI, President Mitterand launched the EUREKA program, the "European response" to SDI. Germany signed the SDI proposal in September 1985, but also signed the EUREKA program, arguing, "that the common security interests of Europe and the US also demand a comparable state of the respective economic and technological developments. If we want to strengthen the European pillar of the transatlantic bridge, it also presupposes that we must increase the technological and industrial efficiency in Europe" (United Nations University, website). The rise of Gorbachev as Secretary General of the Soviet Union and his policy of Glasnost and Perestroika shifted the SDI discussion into the background and

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<sup>82</sup> Howe, Sir Geoffrey - U.K. Secretary of State - 1983-1988

<sup>83</sup> Maginot line: French defense line created after World War I to fend off future German attacks

<sup>84</sup> Mitterand, Francois - French President - 1981-1995

<sup>85</sup> Kohl, Helmut - German Chancellor - 1982-1998

the EUREKA program disappeared. Gorbachev's policy led to the end of the East-West conflict, which culminated in the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989.

## **I. POST COLD WAR**

With the downfall of the Soviet Union, NATO's former enemy, political pressure began to mount again in the U.S. to reduce American forces stationed in Europe. This discussion was triggered by the long-standing congressional discontent over burden sharing in NATO. Observing this debate, the Germans began to ask the same question the French had raised earlier: How reliable was the American commitment to its allies, and would the end of the Cold War mean the departure of American troops from Europe? (Kaplan, 1999, p.187).

With the Treaty of Maastricht<sup>86</sup> in 1991 the Europeans appeared to be ready to manage any threat to European security themselves. Furthermore, they agreed on establishing a common defense policy, with the decision to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) in 1999. The mention of a European army caused uneasiness among several of the transatlantic partners. A British commentator described the situation as follows:

"NATO as a whole is not worried about that, but the Americans are. Washington fears that its influence over European strategic defense thinking may be diluted. The US is particularly concerned about French insistence that the EU should have an independent military planning apparatus, which could draw on military resources presently at the disposal of NATO" (Brown, 2001).

Britain and France took a leading role in the ERRF, albeit driven by different motives. While Paris wanted to show that Europe was able to act independently of the US, London was keen to prove its positive attitude towards the EU.

France had long been the European leader in furthering both the removal of the United States and the empowering of Europe as it pressed its campaign for an "independent" Europe (Kaplan, 1999, p. 189). In an editorial of the magazine "Le débat

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<sup>86</sup> Treaty of Maastricht 1991 - The treaty provides for a single European currency, common citizenship, common foreign and security policy, a more effective European Parliament, and a common labor policy.

stratégique," a French commentator predicted after the 1994 Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which featured the Partnership for Peace program, that this would be the last time the United States would impose its will on the Council (Editorial - Le débat stratégique, 1994, p.1).

The Bosnian conflict in 1992 created new frictions between Europeans and Americans. While America complained about Europe's unwillingness to take charge of a matter in its own backyard, the Europeans refused to accept "lectures" from a country that would not provide troops for the UN mission. In 1993, Secretary of State Christopher urged the Europeans to act and at least lift the embargo on arms against Bosnia, which from the American point of view had previously only helped to support the Serbian side. Christopher's mission failed and was perceived as a loss of status for the Americans. In fall of 1994 the Americans removed their ships from the Mediterranean naval embargo<sup>87</sup> as an answer to the European's constant refusal of American advice. American pressure for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs had jeopardized British and French forces whose governments resented an American leadership role but withheld troops. On the other side the Americans never held back with their annoyance over European unwillingness to identify the Serbs as aggressors and act accordingly (Kaplan, 1999, p.192).

During the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin the Clinton administration pushed the European allies towards a greater responsibility in security politics, but still under American supervision. The new concept incorporated full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including joint consultations on how to address contingencies (Final communiqué, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1996, p.506<sup>88</sup>). The communiqué states that, "The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will approve the release of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, keep itself informed on their use through monitoring with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through regular consultations with the WEU Council, and keep their use under review". While Secretary of State Christopher remarked, "NATO is going to be stronger and more flexible," the French Foreign Minister de Charette<sup>89</sup> spoke of a "great

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<sup>87</sup> Operation Sharp Guard, 15 June 1993 - 19 June 1996

<sup>88</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996

<sup>89</sup> de Charette, Hervé - French Foreign Minister - 1995-1997

success for Europe." He also added a less noticed sentence, which underlined the French dissatisfaction: "The European security identity effectively leads to a point, where the United States will hold their security political commitment up in Europe" (Frankenberger, 1996, p.3).

By late 1998, however, attitudes had begun to change toward European defense, most notably in the United Kingdom and France. This shift culminated in the signing of the Saint Malo declaration, which proposed that Europe's joint defense would be handled through the European Union (EU). It stated that the EU needed "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis" (Andréani et al, 2001, p.20). The Saint Malo declaration posed a serious dilemma for the Americans. The United States had always supported stronger European defense cooperation; although some believed that this was only because such cooperation was never more than a vague, unformulated notion (Mathiopoulos, 1999, p.69). Once it became clear that cooperation could actually become a reality, however, American policy makers reacted quickly. Secretary of State Albright<sup>90</sup> summed up the American position with the "three Ds" policy: no duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination. No duplication referred to the idea that Europeans should not build forces (headquarters, infrastructure, etc.) in addition to their national or NATO forces. The Americans were concerned that purely European forces would be formulated from existing forces rather than added to them, which would weaken both NATO itself and the commitment of any given state to NATO. Given the present political and financial climate, in which no European government would be willing to significantly increase its defense efforts or budget in order to create additional European forces, the Americans believed that duplication would inevitably lead to decoupling. The third D was no discrimination against non EU-NATO members, by which Albright meant principally Turkey. But the EU governments have made it clear that as long as a country is not member of the EU it cannot expect to vote in the Council of Ministers on whether to approve EU actions. Another issue between the Europeans and the Americans was which should be the "organization of first choice." Should NATO meet first and eventually decide to hand over the problem to the EU or should the EU

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<sup>90</sup> Albright, Madeleine K. - U.S. Secretary of State - 1996-2001



decide if it could cope with the problem or if it would be better to ask NATO for help? This theological argument had little to do with common sense or the real world. The establishment of the EU-NATO working groups and various agreements finally left most American policy makers satisfied on the issue of NATO's relationship with the EU. Still, the rationale for the Europeans was that "Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs" and that the Europeans would contribute to the "vitality of a modernized Atlantic alliance" (Andréani et al, 2001, p 20). Finally, the Americans swallowed these principles at the Washington Summit in April 1999.

The Cologne Summit in June 1999 defined the European Union's objective as a "European Security and Defense Policy" (ESDP), to avoid using the vague-sounding European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI), which had been current in NATO since 1994. The summit agreed that the European defense policy would require the possibility of all EU members, including non-allied members, to fully participate on an equal footing in EU operations. Furthermore, the Cologne Summit decided on the institutional framework for a European defense.

The following Helsinki Summit in December 1999 tackled the issue of boosting Europe's military capabilities. One goal was the creation of a separate, non-NATO fighting force of 65,500 soldiers from 13 European nations (Appendix B). Again, U.S. Secretary of State Albright stressed that the Euroforce must be clear and the mission must be defined. "A Euroforce must not discriminate against NATO members who are not in the EU, must not decouple the U.S. from Europe and must not duplicate NATO structures and capabilities" (Veterans of Foreign Wars website, 2001). On the one hand the Americans welcomed a stronger European military potential, but on the other hand also feared a rivalry towards NATO. The American position was best described as "more Europe in NATO, but no totally independent Europe" (Thraenert, 2000, p.8). Deputy Secretary of State Talbott<sup>91</sup> expressed the position of the Clinton administration when he said: "We do not want to see an ESDI that first is developed within NATO, then grows out of NATO and finally moves away from NATO" (Brill, 1999, p.12).

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<sup>91</sup> Talbott, Strobe - U.S. Deputy Secretary of State - 1994-2001

During the early months of 2000, a difference between the British and Americans, on the one hand, and the French, on the other, threatened to turn into a disruptive row. The Anglo-Saxons argued that NATO and the EU should start discussing how to link with each other. The French opposed the early establishment of formal contacts, arguing that until the EU had established new institutions, the two organizations should remain at arms length. They feared that the new and fragile ESDP could easily be squashed, or "otanisé" (NATO-ized), and they worried that NATO's bureaucrats were keen to get their feet into the EU's door (Andréani et al, 2001, pp.25-26). The British media, which had largely ignored the 1998 Saint Malo initiative and its consequences, became obsessed with the "European Army." This was perceived as a French plot to destroy NATO and to send the Americans home. Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman Maude<sup>92</sup> warned that a "political" rather than a "military enterprise" threatened to pitch the EU into conflict with the US. (Marsden, 2000, p.1) Former U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary Perle<sup>93</sup> commented that the European Army is "a French plan to advance its towering conceit." Weinberger<sup>94</sup>, Defense Secretary under President Reagan, said, "It will unquestionably undermine the American commitment to NATO and risk the loss of fragile public support in the United States" (Norton-Taylor, 2000).

While the French and Americans were arguing over details of the planning arrangements for the rapid reaction forces, the French Defense Minister, Richard<sup>95</sup>, told his American counterpart, Cohen<sup>96</sup>, that in the long run the EU might have its own operational planning capabilities. This again led to a stern American reaction, delivered in Brussels, before the planned Nice meeting. Cohen cautioned that the EU defense initiative could lead to NATO becoming a "relic." At the same time he conceded that "all of us recognize the need that we get this process right as the EU develops its capability" (Cohen, 2000, p.12), again underlining the importance of the transatlantic bond. Earlier

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<sup>92</sup> Maude, Francis - U.K. member of parliament, spokesman of conservative party

<sup>93</sup> Perle, Richard - U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy - 1981-1987

<sup>94</sup> Weinberger, Caspar W. - U.S. Secretary of Defense - 1981-1987

<sup>95</sup> Richard, Alain - French Secretary of Defense - 1997-today

<sup>96</sup> Cohen, William C. - U.S. Secretary of Defense - 1997-2001

that year he had emphasized, "Even with a view on history it can not be of Europe's interest to weaken the United States" (Cohen, 2000, p.12).

## **J. INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM**

When the Republicans came into power again in early 2001 a new "ice-age" seemed to emerge in the transatlantic relations. During the eight years the party had been out of office, many representatives had not followed the European debates closely. While Rumsfeld<sup>97</sup>, the Defense Secretary of the Bush<sup>98</sup> administration, did not openly attack ESDP, he did mention he was "a little worried." At the same time he reassured the allies that the Americans were willing to let the Europeans argue their case. However, other American politicians seem to harbor more hostile feelings towards ESDP, and many Republicans regard a strong Europe as inherently undesirable. In their opinion the US can more easily play off one EU member against another if Europe remains divided. They worry that a united Europe with an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) might challenge American leadership of the alliance and thwart ambitions in many areas of the world (Andréani et al, 2001, p.33).

The proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) is another issue causing tensions in the European-American relationship. German Chancellor Schroeder<sup>99</sup> expressed reservations when the plans were first announced. He proposed an exchange of views within the NATO council to find "common answers to the existing and possible future threat of peace." An unnamed aide to the French president was less diplomatic in his statement. He said, "Washington's foreign policy is reckless, insensible and based on fundamentalism" (Wiedmann, 2001, p.137). British Prime Minister Blair<sup>100</sup> planned to put himself into a bridging position between the U.S. and Europe. His idea called for American support of British policy, thus equipping them with the necessary political weight within Europe. Britain in turn would remain the U.S.'s most valuable ally in Europe helping the Americans to gain support from reluctant European partners because,

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<sup>97</sup> Rumsfeld, Donald - U.S. Secretary of Defense - 2001-today

<sup>98</sup> Bush, George W. - U.S. President - 2001-today

<sup>99</sup> Schroeder, Gerhard - German Chancellor - 1998-today

<sup>100</sup> Blair, Tony - British Prime Minister - 1997-today

in Blair's opinion, the Europeans would most likely listen to a European rather than to an American "bully", as President Bush was perceived by many European countries, especially during the first months of his presidency (compare Spiegel cover story: "The Little Sheriff", 2001). Rice<sup>101</sup>, the National Security Advisor to the Bush administration, rebuked this idea by saying: "I do not think that the president sees Prime Minister Blair as a kind of mediator to the European allies..." (Hyland, 2001).

The American rejection of the Kyoto climate treaty to reduce the greenhouse effect, which would have obligated the U.S. to reduce its carbon-dioxide exhaustion, was perceived as an attack of the only superpower against the environment. French Prime Minister Jospin<sup>102</sup> complained, "Kyoto is intended to save the survival of the planet and the U.S. does not even care."

The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the European-American relationship immediately and issues such as NMD and Kyoto became dormant. All NATO members condemned the terrorist attacks in strong terms. For the first time since NATO's inception, Article V of the Washington Treaty was invoked, recognizing the attack on the United States as an attack on all of the NATO members. The Council of the European Union met in a special session on September 12, 2001 and issued a declaration in which it condemned the terrorist attacks, offered to work with the United States, and said it would spare no efforts to help identify, bring to justice and punish those responsible.

Domestic reactions to the Article V decision were mixed in many countries. Britain's Prime Minister Blair promised to stand by America's side in case of a military intervention and French President Chirac<sup>103</sup> promised military support, but also demanded consultations in case of a request for French military and the right to decide how the French troops were to participate. German Chancellor Schroeder strongly supported the French position in his policy statement of October 2001. He said, "that the duty to stand by the allies involves also a right. This would be the right to be informed and to be consulted" (Gerhard Schroeder, 2001).

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<sup>101</sup> Rice, Condoleezza - National Security Advisor to the President of the United States - 2001-today

<sup>102</sup> Jospin, Lionel - French Prime Minister - 1997-today

<sup>103</sup> Chirac, Jacques - French President - 1995-today

Belgium, Spain and Italy promised troops as well, but insisted on prior UN resolutions. Turkey documented its will to support universal political solidarity by offering military support. Other European countries stressed that they supported the decision of invoking Article V, but said they hoped they would not have to get involved militarily. While approximately 70 percent of the British public supported military actions, 86 percent of the Greek citizens voiced strong objections against any military involvement. In the Netherlands thousands went to the street to demonstrate against a U.S. military intervention following the September 11 attacks (Dembinski, HSFK website, 2001).

Even in the United States not everybody was in favor of NATO involvement in an American attack on those who were responsible. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle stated, "NATO's support troubles me. We do not need it, the political benefits are not worth it, and if it is allowed to establish a precedent - if it is allowed to create the sense that we have to get NATO approval under Article V before we do whatever we do next - then, on balance, that support will have been more harmful than helpful" (Perle, 2001, p.85).

After initial support for the military intervention in Afghanistan in most European countries, enthusiasm waned. In Germany, 'Der Stern' ran a cover story called "Stop this war" in early November in which prominent politicians, intellectuals and celebrities expressed opposition to the American "aggression" on the Afghan people. In Britain a "Stop the War Coalition" has made it difficult for Prime Minister Blair to justify increasing British military involvement. (Compare "The Guardian" November 19, 2001)

As always in the more than 50 years of NATO's history these domestic political debates will likely soon also influence the transatlantic dialogue. It remains to be seen whether the post September 11 harmony in the European-American relations will have staying power.

## V. U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE

### A. INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United States maintained a visible presence (see Table 1) on the European continent. As the Europeans became stronger and more unified, they also grew suspicious of their American caretakers and wanted to go their own ways in order to become more self-sufficient. After having been trapped in the East-West struggle of two military superpowers, some European countries now hoped to regain their place among the great powers in the world. The Americans on the other side viewed a stable Europe as essential to their own security. Specifically, a balance among the European powers was required to prevent a single country from dominating the continent and, in turn, threatening the United States (Steven W. Hook, 2000, pp. 319-320).

YEAR	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00
Germany	249	249	228	203	134	105	88	73	49	60	70	66	69
Other Europe	74	71	64	62	54	44	41	37	62	48	42	40	44
Europe, afloat	33	21	18	20	17	17	9	8	4	3	4	4	4

Table 1. Military and Civilian Personnel Strength (End Fiscal Year - In Thousands)<sup>104</sup>.

According to the former Secretary of Defense Cohen "the United States has a permanent and vital national interest in preserving the security of the European and Canadian Allies. Conversely, the Allies in Europe recognize that their security is inextricably tied to that of North America. While there are many dimensions to the transatlantic security relationship, the presence of significant and highly capable U.S. military forces in Europe will remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical linchpin. Behind that presence stands the full array of U.S.-based conventional forces, America's

<sup>104</sup> Source: Annual Report to the President and the Congress, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 2001

unsurpassed nuclear deterrent, our formidable economic power, and our demonstrated political will to defend democratic ideals and values" (Cohen, PDGS website, preface).

The United States defines its "vital interests" as those interests of broad, overriding importance to its survival, safety, and vitality. Among these the physical security and territorial integrity of the United States and that of its allies are principal. So is the protection of U.S. critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack. In Europe these vital interests and the continuing U.S. commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European security in the 21st century.

As President Clinton said during a Berlin visit in 1998: "America stands with Europe. Today, no less than 50 years ago, our destinies are joined. If Europe is at peace, America is more secure. If Europe prospers, America does as well." (Clinton, 1998, PDGS website)

The attacks on America on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 did not change the basic attitude of the Bush administration towards these issues; yet the attacks set the stage for defining different priorities. They also established that "the geographic position of the United States no longer guarantees immunity from direct attack on its population, territory, and infrastructure (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, p.3)". However, even before the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had stated that the senior leaders of the Defense Department had set out to establish a new strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, p. III).

The resulting strategy is built upon four key goals that will guide the development of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use:

1. Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments
2. Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of its allies and friends
3. Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on the adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure
4. Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails

The United States military presence in Europe plays a critical role in protecting U.S. economic interests. Furthermore it facilitates U.S. military deployments for both crisis and non-crisis missions to assist allies and friends in neighboring regions. Without the bases and host nations support structures available to the U.S. forces through the defense arrangements in Europe, the protection of vital U.S. interests within and outside Europe would be immeasurably more complex, demanding and costly (PDGS website, 2000, p.4). Furthermore, it is depicted as one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to its allies and friends (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, p.11).



## **B. U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE**

The U.S. military presence in Europe represents an essential element of the regional security in Europe but also America's global posture. Overall the U.S. forces are located in several West - European countries. (Table 2)

Belgium	The Netherlands
Denmark	Portugal
Germany	Spain
Italy	United Kingdom
Norway	Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Kosovo

Table 2. Location of U.S. Forces in Europe - Source Author

Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend the U.S. and allied interests in Europe. The presence of overseas forces strengthens the U.S. leadership role in European affairs and supports the United States efforts to extend stability to the developing democracies in the East (DoD website, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, undated, p.1).

Forward stationing and the day-to-day operations with the allies in those countries give opportunities to build and maintain the bonds of the Alliance. Furthermore, the mutual training of the American and European forces results in a certain degree of interoperability among NATO forces, which enables them to conduct joint and combined military operations in Europe but also in other areas of common interest.

As the 1999 Alliance Strategic concept states, "The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests (NATO Alliance Strategic Concept, 1999)."<sup>105</sup> The U.S. force deployment therefore remains essential to the stability and security in Europe. Or, as German Chancellor Schroeder pointed out at a meeting of

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<sup>105</sup> NATO Alliance Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington DC, April 24, 1999

European and U.S. defense experts, "he believes a continuing American military presence in Europe is desirable even if Europe develops its own military strengths."<sup>106</sup>

The changes after the Cold War, especially the newly established sovereignty of a re-united Germany led to a restructuring and reduction process of the U.S. forces in Europe. The U.S. European Command has reduced its forces by over 200,000 troops since 1989. (Table 1) Nuclear forces in Europe have been reduced by over 80 percent since 1991. Overall two out of three U.S. military installations in Europe have been closed since the end of the Cold War.

The remaining United States military presence in Europe is organized under the unified combatant command USEUCOM (U.S. European Command) headed by Commander in Chief USCINCEUR, General Ralston<sup>107</sup>.

USEUCOM's mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations either unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners to enhance the transatlantic security through support of NATO and to promote regional stability. In addition to their role as security guarantors within Europe, the U.S. military units based in Europe are often first to react to emerging crises in Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In their day-to-day non-crisis operations, the stationed forces play a key role in sustaining and improving bilateral security ties with, and the military capabilities of, both Allies and Partners.

The headquarters of the United States European Command includes soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians, and is located at Patch Barracks, in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany. In total, there are approximately 116,000 American military personnel permanently assigned to Europe, Africa and Asia as part of the United States European Command. The USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) (Appendix C) that stretches from the north cap of Norway to the Cape of Good hope in South Africa covers more than 13 million square miles and includes 91 countries and territories and more than one billion people.

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<sup>106</sup> Schroeder, Gerhard, German Chancellor, European and U.S. defense experts meeting, Munich, February, 8<sup>th</sup> 1999

<sup>107</sup> Ralston, Joseph W., General U.S. Air Force - Supreme Allied Commander - 2000-today

Another nine countries and territories are considered to be part of the U.S. area of interest (AOI) (Appendix D), because of possible USEUCOM participation in operations, including exercises involving those countries. These are:

The United States European Command is part of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that allocates responsibilities among the nine combatant commands. This plan establishes the commands' missions, responsibilities and force structure. It also defines the geographical commands' areas of responsibilities. (Chart 1)

Changes have been made to the UCP including establishing the Joint Forces Command as a successor to the U.S. Atlantic Command, placing more emphasis on homeland defense and, effective since October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2000, extending the U.S. European Command's area of responsibility to the water areas around Europe and Africa.




Figure 1. Geographic Areas of Responsibility. 108

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<sup>108</sup> Unified Command Plan - Geographic Areas of Responsibility, (Effective 1 October 2000), in <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unified/>

### **C. UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE**

The Army component in Germany provides substantial elements of two divisions, the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division in Wuerzburg and the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division in Wiesbaden, a corps headquarters in Heidelberg, and associated assets. (Appendix E) Both of the U.S. divisions in Europe belong to multinational corps created by NATO as part of the implementation of the new Alliance Strategic Concept. The United States participates in two of these corps both jointly led with Germany. The U.S. 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division is assigned to a U.S.-led multinational corps. This corps contains one German division and one American division and is commanded by the U.S. V Corps commander. The U.S. 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division is assigned to a German-led multinational corps. In a NATO conflict, this U.S. division would come under the operational control of the German corps commander.<sup>109</sup>

Furthermore, the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division is dual tasked. It does not only participate in the German-American multinational corps but is also assigned to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The purpose of the ARRC is to provide NATO with the ability to quickly respond in force with a broad coalition of allied militaries.<sup>110</sup>

### **D. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN EUROPE**

The United States Air Force Europe (Appendix F) with its headquarters in Ramstein, Germany, has transitioned from a fight-in-place fighter force postured for a large-scale conflict, to a mobile and deployable mixed force that is able to simultaneously operate in several locations. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, USAFE's role in Europe has also expanded to a mission that includes supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and other non-traditional tasks.

In peacetime, USAFE trains and equips U.S. Air Force units pledged to NATO. USAFE plans, conducts, controls, coordinates and supports air and space operations to

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<sup>109</sup> This German-led multinational corps, like all NATO forces in the integrated military command, would ultimately come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe who is also the U.S. CINCEUR

<sup>110</sup> There are only two NATO members who do not contribute forces to the ARRC, one is France, which does not participate in NATO's integrated military command and the other is Iceland, which has no standing military forces.

achieve U.S. national and NATO objectives based on tasks assigned by the commander in chief, United States European Command. Under wartime conditions USAFE assets, augmented by personnel, aircraft and equipment from other major commands and the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, come under the operational command of NATO. The command's inventory of aircraft is ready to perform close air support, air interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range transport and support of maritime operations.

Geographically it is organized through 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Force, with headquarters in Mildenhall, England and 16<sup>th</sup> Air Force with headquarters in Aviano, Italy. The command has six main operating bases - Royal Air Force Bases Lakenheath and Mildenhall in England, Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany, Aviano Air Base in Italy and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.

3<sup>rd</sup> Air Force is responsible for all U.S. Air Force operations and support activities north of the Alps. Furthermore, 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Force task is to take an active role in the leadership of operational contingencies and provide trained staff to lead or augment joint and combined task force headquarters elements. Through the Partnership for Peace program, 3<sup>rd</sup> Air Force manages military contact and assistance for a number of countries in Eastern Europe (U.S. Air Force, website).

16<sup>th</sup> Air Force plans and executes combat air operations in southern Europe and portions of the Middle East and northern Africa as an air component or joint task force headquarters. 16<sup>th</sup> Air Force has been engaged in peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, crisis response, air deterrence or combat operations. Furthermore, they support the Balkan's peace enforcement and northern Iraq no-fly zone enforcement.

#### **E. UNITED STATES NAVY IN EUROPE**

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), operates under two separate operational and administrative chains of command. As the operational Commander in Chief of all U.S. naval forces in Europe, CINCUSNAVEUR is the component Commander of the U. S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR). CINCUSNAVEUR is also the administrative commander in the Department of the Navy

chain of command directly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for management, logistics and communications support of U.S. Navy assets in Europe (United States Navy, website)

While not a NATO command, CINCUSNAVEUR is responsible for ensuring ready forces are available for NATO if the need arises and for logistics support of U.S. Navy ships and aircraft whether they are nationally or NATO assigned. CINCUSNAVEUR also works with NATO commands and member governments in planning, operating and funding NATO facilities used by the U.S. Navy (United States Navy, website)

The principle supporting commands are:

Commander, U.S. SIXTH Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT) embarked aboard USS LASALLE (AGF-3) and home ported in Gaeta, Italy, supports U.S. national interests by maintaining and sustaining combat ready naval forces to enhance regional stability by influencing events before they reach a crisis level. Naval forces can provide a multitude of roles from deterring aggression to providing humanitarian relief as well as crisis response.

Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean (COMFAIRMED) headquartered in Naples, Italy, provides shore support of naval aircraft and ships in the region and operationally controls all U.S. and NATO maritime patrol assets. COMFAIRMED is also responsible for six Mediterranean U.S. naval bases in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Commander, U.S. Naval Activities, United Kingdom (COMNAVACTUK), headquartered in London, provides management and area coordination for U.S. naval activities throughout the United Kingdom and northern Europe. This command also provides administrative support to the staff organization of CINCUSNAVEUR.

Navy and Marine Corps personnel are positioned throughout the Mediterranean, Europe and the United Kingdom. These are either forward deployed on the more than twenty deployed ships, deployed squadrons or stationed on one of the seven bases (Appendix G) in the CINCUSNAVEUR area of responsibility.

The U.S. Naval Support Activities provide, operate and maintain facilities and services to support and enhance the readiness of U.S. and allied forces operating in or transiting through the European theater including ships, aircrafts, detachments and personnel (NSA Souda Bay, website).

The U.S. Naval Air Station Sigonella is the primary support element for the U.S. Sixth Fleet operations (NSA Sigonella, website).

## **F. FUTURE CHANGES**

The attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 prompted changes in the U.S. military global posture (Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, p.25). One of the key goals mentioned earlier is deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the military capacities. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the oversea presence posture, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia is inadequate for the new strategic environment. The transformation of the U.S. military posture begins with the development of new ways to deter conflicts.

In the future deterrence will still depend heavily on forward stationed and forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces. It is essential that U.S. forces possess a wide range of offensive and defensive capabilities that can achieve strategic and operational objectives in the face of determined adversaries (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001, p.25).

Due to the changes in the international security environment the United States Department of Defense new strategic approach therefore is oriented towards developing a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.

The following decisions that will have an effect on Europe have been made:

1. Introduction of Army forward-stationed Interim Brigade Teams (IBCTs) to strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic responsiveness on a

global basis. In consultation with the European allies, the United States envision that an IBCT should be stationed in the European area by 2007.

2. Development of options to shift some of the Marine Corps' afloat pre-positioned equipment from the Mediterranean toward the Indian Ocean and Arabic Gulf.

The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.

It is not determined yet when the last two changes will be put into action.



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## **VI. DATA ANALYSIS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This study provides insights into the American-European relationship before and after 11 September 2001. As presented in the preceding chapters, the relations between the United States and the European countries have been difficult from time to time during the last 50 years. This thesis analyzes a complex and important relationship primarily through the perceptions of nine senior military and political stakeholders. This method has the limitation whereby a number of key players clarify aspects of the relationship, but do not necessarily reflect their respective country's official or popular position. These stakeholders were asked, both by written survey and follow-up telephone interviews, how they regard the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Union (EU) and the future relations between the United States and the European countries.

This chapter presents the results of data analysis used to describe and evaluate the questionnaire responses of nine senior officials from various European countries. Content analysis was used to determine common themes emerging from the respondent's answers. Four main themes emerged concerning the state of European-American relations and perceived impacts of September 11, 2001. A literature review is also factored into the written and oral responses of the responding European senior diplomats.

Although the answers given by the country's representatives cannot be evaluated as speaking for an entire country, they nevertheless provide insight into important issues in the European-American relationship, and also highlight how the Europeans perceive the big three countries in Europe: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

## **B. QUESTIONNAIRE**

Open-ended questions were used to give the respondents the opportunity to elaborate their answers. The respondents were requested to answer these questions from two different perspectives: before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Questions were asked in five major areas:

1. The respondents country's relationship with the United States
2. The European-American relationship
3. Perceptions concerning key European stakeholders
4. Future development of NATO and the WEU
5. United States involvement in Europe

Data are analyzed from two primary sources:

1. Written, semi-structured questionnaire completed by nine senior officials from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Portugal and Norway as well as from officials in NATO and the EU.
2. Telephone interviews, conducted with six of the respondents and three additional stakeholders who did not receive the questionnaire.

The purpose of the interviews was to clarify the written answers and obtain additional information about changes that may have evolved after completing the questionnaires.

All respondents agreed on the fact that the September 11 attacks had a dramatic impact on the European-American relationship and that relations before that date were based on well-developed historical context. The emerging relations between NATO and the EU was generally perceived as the most complicated aspect of the topic, because global terrorism now dominates high-level discussions and negotiations within NATO and the EU.

One NATO respondent particularly emphasized that the events of September 11 already play a decisive role on the current NATO-EU complex. Diplomatic relations between alliance members have been intensified, which found its ultimate expression when Article V of the NATO treaty was invoked for the first time in the Alliance's 50 year history, i.e. an attack on one NATO member denotes an attack on all members. One

NATO representative underlined that the whole strategic debate within NATO will now receive new impulses, but that it will take some time until tangible innovations will show effect in this highly dynamic and politically volatile global arena.

The following section presents the four main themes emerging from the content analysis of the questionnaire responses and the telephone interviews conducted:

**1. The respondents from five European countries indicated consistent and enhanced relationships with the United States pre- and post September 11, 2001**

Regarding the first major area, all respondents characterized their nation's relations with the United States as good to excellent. This is mostly based on their historical ties and positive experiences after World War II. All nations underlined that they were especially grateful for the financial support in the aftermath of World War II. Again, it was stressed that the events of September 11 definitely enhanced relations on a political level. There was almost a complete consensus on several vital issues between each nation and the United States, e.g. a relatively united front in the fight against terrorism and the need to improve economic ties. Additionally, increased cooperation among individual countries and the U.S. and the pursuit of common objectives was perceived as important and gaining consolidation.

**2. The overall European-American relationship appears strong with some concerns**

Answers from the respective country respondents varied regarding their overall perception of European-American relations, particularly concerning lingering U.S. administrative and military dominance. While four out of nine expressed the view that overall relations are very good, one clearly indicated that the relationship is not necessarily good, but has come of age and is now mostly dominated by mutual respect and shared values. This EU respondent expressed that the relations were subject to mutual mistrust in certain elements of U.S. and European administrations.

"The U.S. want dominance in leadership; we Europeans have to show that we are capable of being an equal partner in dealing with world issues such as crisis management.

There is a perception in the U.S. that this could limit U.S. influence."

He added that the events of September 11 have contributed to better relations, but cautions not to be overly ecstatic and to wait "how long this will last."

From the respective countries perspective the top strategic issues between Europe and the United States are framed as the following critical questions of concern:

1. How can the new currency, the Euro, be implemented with positive outcomes for both the European and American financial markets?
2. How can the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) be formulated and implemented to create mutually supportive attitudes in view of NATO and EU developments?
3. How can the enlargement of NATO be carried out to increase the European-American security and be beneficial to global peace?

In all answers the influence of the September 11 events was clearly visible, and the mutual fight against terrorism emerged as a newly defined issue critically important to all respondents.

Asked about the most contentious issues, several respondents underlined that the fight against terrorism will be supported within Europe only as long as it is successful. One EU representative expressed his concerns that "failure could in the end lead to a frosting of relations between Europe and the U.S."

Another issue perceived as equally contentious is the development of ESDP. A northern European representative stated that it "can potentially damage NATO and develop into a competing structure if not handled wisely." A southern European on the other hand said that ESDP might give the United States the possibility to downsize its troops in Europe without necessarily reducing its interests. There was agreement among all respondents that the common goal should be to integrate ESDP into NATO and thus strengthen the Alliance. A Europe without ESDP on the other side would lead to a Europe that would continue to dramatically lag behind the U.S. in military capacity and would be without a coherent voice in security and military matters.

The issue of NATO enlargement also was highlighted as one of the most important issues needing attention. As one respondent pointed out, consolidating the current NATO as a military organization could create a "vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe."

### **3. Most influential European stakeholders continue to be France, Germany and the United Kingdom**

The respondents identified a variety of major stakeholders in Europe and in their countries. In the European arena the big three - France, Germany and United Kingdom - play an important role and are identified as the countries that have the most influence and power. The opinions of the respondents about the preeminence of these three countries, their policies and how they are regarded throughout Europe are unanimous.

France is perceived as the most European-centered country in Europe and, as always, is suspicious of the Americans. The consensus among other Europeans is that they seem to strive for a greater autonomy from the U.S. and are predominantly focused on national matters. One respondent pointed out, "They never forget that Europe, which may mean France, has a role to play." Another described the French behavior as constantly acting insulted, but "no one really knows why."

Germany is perceived as the country, which plays an increasingly active political role within Europe, but also in the European-American relations. Over the past ten years, Germany was faced with the challenge of coming to terms with its regained sovereignty after re-unification and the substantial withdrawal of allied troops. Suddenly, Germany was not the "protected" country anymore. It was urged to play a more active political and military role in NATO and the United Nations. Today, Germany plays a crucial part in the European Union and also as a mediator between Europe and the United States. In the war on terrorism, Germany has emerged as a key partner in the investigation to find perpetrators of the attacks and has provided essential intelligence to the United States. It is also helping to craft a unified EU role in the war. These developments represent a historical departure from the past when Germany played a far more limited role in military conflicts because of its heavy historical baggage. One German representative still

saw Germany "sitting between the chairs" of close relations to Europe and especially France on the one side, and close ties to the United States on the other.

The United Kingdom has a reputation of maintaining strong ties with the U.S. that always focus on the Atlantic link. One representative pointed out that the U.K. supports the U.S. whenever they deem it appropriate for maintaining their "privileged partnership" and to compensate for their special role in Europe. Another described the British as "always stressing their special relationship with the U.S. and frankly, our people are tired of hearing that."

Turkey also is named as one of the major stakeholders, especially now that the EU has decided to soon accept Turkey into the union. The current struggle and emerging discussions going on between the EU and Turkey requires an additional discussion of this issue. Since Russia has been accepted into the European council, it is perceived as a new major stakeholder in Europe.

Within the respondent's countries, three major groups are identified as additional important stakeholders:

1. Industrial and economic decision-makers are perceived as influential business and financial actors. They manage the European domestic trade as well as trade with the U.S., consequently they voice their interests and use their influence in their respective governments to stimulate business and trade issues.
2. Environmental groups have considerable influence, i.e. in nearly every country the Green Party is represented in the government. Environmental special interests are perceived to directly influence the eco-political decision-making process.
3. The media are perceived as a major factor influencing public opinion.

#### **4. A Europe without a U.S. presence would be a weak Europe**

Regarding the specific scenario of the U.S. substantially reducing its military presence and involvement in Europe, respondents were asked to describe strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, e.g. a cursory SWOT analysis was conducted.

All respondents regard this as a worst-case scenario and conclude that in terms of military strength a weaker Europe would be the consequence. Particularly now (months after September 11), substantial removal of U.S. troops from Europe would leave a weak Europe behind and would likely mean the end of NATO. One senior official expressed his concerns that a reduction of U.S. military involvement would "impact the spirit of solidarity, cohesiveness and common interests." He added, "It would weaken NATO, promote new objectives in those countries which want to promote a more autonomous Europe, would give no added value, but add harm to our common endeavor."

Another official focused on the widening gap of military capabilities between the United States forces and the European forces, which is already obvious at present. He stressed, "there is confusion between what the EU can do itself and what it thinks it can do assuming NATO/US assistance. Even with a substantial increase in the European's military budgets it would take a long time until Europe could match the U.S. in strength." One respondent pointed out that at the present time situations like the one in ex-Yugoslavia could not be handled without U.S. military assistance. Yet, two respondents considered the downsizing of the U.S. military in Europe as a possibility, although not very likely at the moment. They said that if such a reduction were to take place, it should be done gradually in order to allow the creation of necessary military means and capabilities in Europe. Then, one concluded, it might be possible that "the situation will not be affected." Yet, there was no doubt in their mind, that either way NATO would be harmed.



### **C. SWOT-ANALYSIS CONCERNING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. MILITARY IN EUROPE**

The following Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis provides a list of possible strategic issues and developments, that could be the consequence of a substantial reduction of U.S. military in Europe.

#### **Strengths:**

- U.S. could use excess manpower for homeland defense
- Europe would build up its own defense forces as planned
- No contentious burden-sharing discussion

#### **Weaknesses:**

- No common vision of U.S. and Europe
- Less communication between U.S. and Europe
- Excess manpower cannot be used adequately in the U.S. and forces have to be reduced
- Reduction in U.S. recruitment and retention
- European defense weaker
- U.S. overall defense weaker
- America has no bases in the Mediterranean area
- Europe would be required to increase military budgets in order to build up its forces
- Europe is forced to increase its defense spending
- Relations between Europe and America are weakened

**Opportunities:**

- European unification process results in a stronger, unified European Union
- European military enlargement provides some economic stimulus

**Threats:**

- "Splendid Isolation" of United States (e.g. post World War I)
- NATO dissolves and vulnerability increases
- European Union is not able to deal with problems in its own region, e.g. Balkans
- Fundamentalist countries assert non-western ideologies

**D. ADDITIONAL RESPONSES & FINDINGS**

Besides the empirical main themes and SWOT findings, two additional issues arise:

**1. The further development between NATO and the WEU**

The interviewed senior officials were asked which major problems NATO will face within the next five years. Seven out of eight respondents identified three primary issues.

- NATO enlargement, which was named as one of the nations' priorities, is viewed as problematic, because it could "corrode NATO military efficiency and self-confidence and turn it into 'No action talk only'."
- The fight against terrorism now has high priority for most member countries.
- The ESDP will continue to develop, most likely at a quicker pace than previously anticipated.

Asked to give a personal evaluation of a best-case scenario, all respondents expressed, that NATO should be enlarged. One official went as far as mentioning 24 member countries as a goal. A problem already observed is that it is likely that "NATO will be hampered by new members that are not ready to take on a credible burden themselves." Another unanimous answer was that a closer and smoother cooperation between NATO and the EU should be a primary objective. The biggest threat would be a European Union that creates confusion on the expectations concerning NATO. At this time "the EU is trying in vain to do too much itself and at the same time burdening NATO with all sorts of requests." In unison with this best-case exercise, the worst-case scenario would include competition and duplicated structures between Europe and the United States, according to several respondents.

One respondent expressed a likely case scenario. In that "NATO will somehow survive, will further enlarge, but will have less and less impact on real affairs."

## **2. The Declaration of Laeken**

Three additional informal interviews were conducted with senior officials who did not complete the questionnaire, but whose responses provided relevant insights on the topic. All of the respondents highlighted the most current European developments, which presently seem to influence mainly inner European relations but which in the near future could also dramatically change the U.S.-European partnership.

On December 15, 2001 the European Council adopted the Declaration of Laeken (Appendix H), which deals with issues concerning the future of the European Union. In order to determine further lines of action, the European Council appointed a Convention, composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union. The Council's task will be to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and to try to identify the various possible responses.

One question asked is whether Europe should play a leading role in the new world order. The goal best to pursue is to become "a power able both to play a stabilizing role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and people (Declaration of Laeken)." Furthermore, the Declaration states "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalization." The final communiqué implies that

the European population expects Europe to become more involved in foreign affairs, security and defense and to develop "greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in, around Europe, and in the rest of the world." British Prime Minister Blair summed up the Declaration with regard to Europe's power in a different way. "You have the United States, plainly the superpower of the world, but the point here is, that countries in the European Union can project real power as well - if we are prepared to work together" (Reid, 2001, p.A35). The outcome of this Declaration is not clear or easy to define. While one respondent expected it to be a major step in the unification process of the European Community, another perceived it as a declaration of good will that will have no influence in the foreseeable future. The Declaration of Laeken suggests strategic questions regarding the future of Europe, a possible constitution for European citizens and defines the political global role Europe will play in the future. The Convention will present its findings and answers to these strategic questions in March 2003. Even if it is only a declaration of good will, it perhaps represents creativity and boldness emerging from a changing Europe.

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## VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the more than 50 years in which NATO has secured peace and stability in Europe, relations between the U.S. and its European allies remain a persistent paradox - unified, yet at considerable odds. It is a partnership that is consistent and strong, yet troubled and fragile. This study examined aspects of this complex relationship both in historical terms and from the perspective of nine senior officials from six countries. Written questionnaires were analyzed, including telephone interviews with an additional nine participants. Although the total number of respondents is relatively small, each participant was extremely qualified to comment on the topic, and considering the promise of complete anonymity, their views were remarkably candid. The overall conclusions of the study are based on a focused analysis of relevant literature, and content analysis of purposive interviews conducted with diverse stakeholders. Conclusions are limited and may or may not reflect European and American mainstream perceptions on the complex construct of international relations. Content analysis did reveal noteworthy themes, and all conclusions are presented below.

### B. CONCLUSIONS

**European American relations are strong, and were enhanced post September 11th, however, several respondents clarified that terrorism is not new to Europeans, and policies should be broadened to also deal with the roots of terrorism, e.g., poverty, disease, and environmental degradation.**

While initially most European allies declared their undivided solidarity with the Americans, support for the U.S. approach in the fight against terrorism is waning. Europeans view war as a last resort and therefore are suspicious of the American's apparent preoccupation with the "war against terrorism." The French Foreign Minister Vedrine conceded, "there was perhaps a certain under-evaluation in Europe of the terrible shock which was the discovery by the Americans of their vulnerability. But that does not explain the ascending unilateralist temptation. Our friendship and our solidarity for the

American people are quite real, but that does not mean that we must align ourselves with all the aspects of their policy. It is not a question to criticize the United States in a sterile way, but to invite them to adopt a different attitude" (Amalric, 2002).

**Three prominent stakeholders have emerged representing the overall ‘voice’ of European policies: France, Germany and United Kingdom.**

In the European arena the big three - France, Germany and United Kingdom - play an important role and are identified as the countries that have the most influence and power. Before any kind of European meeting the big three get together separately to discuss and decide on the major issues at stake at any given time. Nevertheless, the three countries have different perceptions of their respective role within Europe and the world. France would like to play a more important role in Europe and is striving for a greater autonomy from the U.S. Germany plays an increasingly active political role and a crucial part within the European Union. It also acts as a mediator between Europe and the United States. The United Kingdom has always maintained an especially close relationship with its American partners. Yet, recently the special relationship has come under closer scrutiny both inside and outside the British Isles. After the introduction of the Euro as the common currency in most member states in the EU in January 2002 the British public is questioning whether or not the country should intensify its relations to the European allies rather than the Americans to avoid further economic and political isolation.

**The influence of interpersonal relations between the most influential European stakeholders and the American administration appears more substantial and influential than publicly acknowledged, i.e., political relations can not be summarized in a consistent rational frame.**

One example of how much relations can suffer when state leaders do not get along is the frosty transatlantic atmosphere prevalent during the Carter administration, which was based on incompatible political positions between the U.S. president and European heads of state just as much as on the mutually adverse attitudes between Carter

and his German and French counterparts at the time. Misunderstandings in the transatlantic partnership are not necessarily based on actual events but are often fueled by how the partners choose to perceive one another. This phenomenon also appears relevant for current U.S.-European relations.

**European stakeholders perceive the current U.S. administration as generally reflective of a bygone era, i.e., fighting “new” challenges with old methods.**

In other words, the current American Bush administration is perceived to be markedly reminiscent of the previous Bush administration in terms of content, rhetoric, and leadership style. For example, the administration's approach in the global fight against terrorism is perceived to be based too much on military action, and too little on transatlantic diplomacy actions. German, and other news sources, often portray the American president in derogatory terms on the covers of their magazines. Shortly after his inauguration in 2001, President Bush was depicted as "The Little Sheriff" (Spiegel No. 17, 2001), and in 2002 after his remarks of the "axis of evil" and his determination to fight terrorism in the world he was pictured as Rambo, behind him prominent members of his administration are shown dressed like other famous fighters against evil, e.g. Batman, Conan, etc. (Spiegel No. 8, 2002).

Patten<sup>111</sup>, the European Union's external affairs commissioner, recently underlined that "you can't deal with the dark side of globalization - the terrorism, the crime, the drugs, the trafficking of human beings, the relationship between environmental degradation and poverty and security - unless you deal with them as a result of multilateral engagement" (Richburg, 2002).

**The numbers of European partners are increasing and European voices are moving tentatively closer to a common voice on foreign and security issues.**

The Declaration of Laeken (Appendix H) suggests strategic questions regarding the future of Europe, a possible constitution for European citizens and discusses which

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<sup>111</sup> Patten, Chris - Member of the European Commission, External Relations - 1999-today



political global role Europe will play in the future. German Foreign Minister Fischer called it the "most ambitious reform project of the European Union," French President Chirac spoke of its "historical meaning" and EU-President Prodi<sup>112</sup> said the gathering during which the declaration was officially passed had an "outstanding significance for the future of Europe." Other European politicians simply view it as a "declaration of good-will." Until mid-2003 the Convent will develop recommendations for the next reform of the EU, yet so far the goals of the declaration are only roughly defined.

**Important European domestic issues such as arms sales and controls, nuclear treaties, and climate and economic issues appear to dominate European concerns, often over-shadowing the American preoccupation on terrorism.**

Once these domestic issues are highlighted by the European media, perceived as essential by the public and transported into the political decision making process they can lead to a poisoned climate within the transatlantic partnership. Prime examples of recent American unilateral decisions that caused a deep rift in the U.S.-European relations are the U.S.'s opposition to the Kyoto protocol on global warming, and several disarmament accords including the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. French Foreign Minister Vedrine concludes: "The fight against terrorism cannot hold the place of policy for all the problems of the world" (Amalric, 2002).

### **C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Europeans should increase their efforts to merge diverse political voices into more unified messages to the United States administration and the world stage.**

In order to change and improve the U.S.-European relationship it is necessary for Europe to unify its voice and work together more closely along the lines that Italian President Berlusconi<sup>113</sup> recently suggested with regards to European travel diplomacy following the September 11, 2001 attacks. At the time nearly all European leaders visited U.S. President Bush individually to discuss further actions concerning the fight against

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<sup>112</sup> Prodi, Romano - European Commission President - 1999-today

<sup>113</sup> Berlusconi, Silvio - Italian Prime Minister - 2001-today

terrorism. However, in an alternative, unified scenario the President of the EU, Solana<sup>114</sup>, could have gathered all opinions and information from the European leaders and in one visit met with the U.S. President as the "European representative."

**European influential stakeholders should implement the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and demonstrate its central pillar role in future European-American relations.**

In the future, a unified Europe could use its resources jointly to play a more decisive and stabilizing role in world politics and consequently relieve the United States from being solely responsible and capable to deal with global crisis management situations. A Europe that would work together more closely than it does now could project real power as well. This new European power projection would elevate their role as equal partners. It might be decidedly more effective for the two regions to deal with global issues such as crisis prevention, resolution, and monitoring. This future, recommended scenario would also include a closer cooperation between NATO and the EU, where presently the EU needs to be watchful of not creating confusion about its present abilities and disabilities.

Another recommendation is for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to be formulated and implemented to create mutually supportive attitudes in view of NATO and EU developments. Finally, NATO-enlargement should be executed in a way that increases European-American security, thereby increasing the likelihood of political and military stability and global peace.

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<sup>114</sup> Solana, Javier - Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy - 1999-today

**The American administration, business leadership and media should substantially increase their efforts to explain, clarify and market American perceptions and policies on major issues; e.g. terrorism, global warming, economics, etc. and vice versa, the European Union influential stakeholders must also clarify and explain their perceptions and decision making processes.**

Closer U.S.-European cooperation also entails the necessity to develop a better and more realistic understanding of one's partners. From a European perspective this means that the U.S. should treat their European allies less like children and more like respected, equal partners. In other words, relationships and dialogue should be actively structured towards the understanding and appreciation of separate and diverse, yet equal experience and capabilities.

Europe has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. While in the beginning it was mainly concerned with inner-European issues such as the creation of the Euro-zone and developing closer relations within the EU, after the attacks of September 11, America's European allies clearly demonstrated that they deliver when necessary and are willing to contribute to each other's security in the transatlantic arena. However, the unilateral solos of the U.S. administration in the war against terrorism, the proclamation of the "axis of evil," the talk about a possible expansion of the war to other countries has turned the attitude of many Europeans against actively supporting their allies. Several partners now openly rebel against the "big brother", as shown by the French and the German foreign ministries. The Europeans have repeatedly expressed that they prefer a diplomatic solution to the military approach presently favored by the U.S. administration.

**All parties must recognize the seriousness of the possibly widening gap between European and American policies, values and beliefs, to stem an emerging threat of deteriorating relations.**

If the present political trends continue without being mended, Europe and the United States could drift apart, thereby threatening security and successful prosecution of the fight against terrorism. There is no doubt that a Europe without a U.S. presence would

be a weak Europe that could be endangered by fundamentalist countries, which emphasize non-western ideologies and in fact threaten the European region. A United States without a supporting Europe would lose its influences and access to regions of vital interest such as the Middle East or Africa, which could ultimately threaten the safety and security of many nation states, which hang in the balance.

Among these risks, the physical security and territorial integrity of the United States and its allies are principal. So is the protection of U.S. critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack. In Europe these vital interests and the continuing U.S. commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European security in the 21st century.

Now more than ever, it is vital for Europeans and Americans to demonstrate that they are not only paying lip service to their self-proclaimed emphasis on following a common goal, but that they are willing to reach that goal as equal partners to ensure stability for their respective regions and ultimately global peace. It is time to make sure that the U.S.-European partnership is more than "No Action Talk Only."

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## **APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE**

### **Your country's relationship with the United States:**

1. How would you characterize the relationship between your home country and the United States? Has this recently changed?
2. Which issues do you consider to be the most vital to this relationship?

### **European-American Relationship:**

1. How would you characterize the current European-American relationship? Has this changed within the last year or two and if so, how?
2. From your perspective what are the top three strategic issues (challenges or problems) regarding the current European-American relationship?
3. Which of these do you think are the most contentious and why?
4. Which of these issues can your country help to resolve or positively influence? How?
5. What are possible alternatives? What would be the consequences if these issues were not resolved?

### **Roles and Stakeholders:**

1. Who are the major stakeholders (individuals / groups) in Europe?
2. How are the German, the French and the British current policies regarding European-US relations perceived in your country?
3. What goals does your country hope to achieve within the framework of the European-American alliance? Is there clarity and consensus about this?
4. Who do you think would be most opposed to this? Why?

**The future development of NATO and WEU:**

1. Which issues do you think are going to be the most challenging that NATO will face in the coming five years?
2. What are the best, the worst or the most likely case scenarios for future NATO development in your opinion?
3. How do you think the WEU is going to develop politically and from a military perspective?
4. How will these developments influence the European Security and Defense Policy?

**US involvement in Europe:**

1. If the United States were to substantially reduce their military involvement in Europe, what do you think would be the effects in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats?

## APPENDIX B. TROOP CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN RAPID REACTION FORCE

COUNTRY	TROOPS
<b>Germany</b>	<b>13,500</b>
<b>Britain</b>	<b>12,500</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>12,000</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>6,000</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>6,000</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>5,000</b>
<b>Greece</b>	<b>3,000</b>
<b>Finland</b>	<b>2,000</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2,000</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>1,000</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>1,000</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>1,000</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	<b>500</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,500</b>

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## APPENDIX C. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

### Africa

• Algeria	• Equatorial Guinea	• Niger
• Angola	• Gabon	• Nigeria
• Benin	• The Gambia	• Rwanda
• Botswana	• Ghana	• Sao Tome and Principe
• Burkina Faso	• Guinea	• Senegal
• Burundi	• Guinea-Bissau	• Sierra Leone
• Cameroon	• Lesotho	• South Africa
• Cape Verde	• Liberia	• Swaziland
• Central African Republic	• Libya	• Tanzania
• Chad	• Malawi	• Togo
• Congo	• Mali	• Tunisia
• Cote D'Ivoire	• Mauritania	• Uganda
• Democratic Republic of the Congo	• Morocco	• Zambia
	• Mozambique	• Zimbabwe
	• Namibia	

### Middle East

• Israel	• Lebanon	• Syria
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### Europe

• Albania	• Georgia	• Netherlands
• Andorra	• Germany	• Norway
• Armenia	• Greece	• Poland
• Austria	• Holy See	• Portugal
• Azerbaidzan	• Hungary	• Romania
• Belarus	• Ireland	• San Marino
• Belgium	• Italy	• Serbia
• Bosnia	• Latvia	• Montenegro
• Herzegovina	• Liechtenstein	• Kosovo
• Bulgaria	• Lithuania	• Slovakia
• Croatia	• Luxembourg	• Slovenia
• Cyprus	• Macedonia,	• Spain
• Czech Republic	Former Yugoslav	• Sweden
• Denmark	Republic of	• Switzerland
• Estonia	• Malta	• Turkey
• Finland	• Moldova	• Ukraine
• France	• Monaco	• United Kingdom



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## **APPENDIX D. AREAS OF INTEREST (AOI)**

### **Europe:**

- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyz Republic
- Russia
- Tajikistan
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan
- Water Areas around Europe

### **Africa:**

- Western Sahara
- Water Areas around Africa

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## APPENDIX E. UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE-TACTICAL COMMAND INDEX

<b>TASK FORCE EAGLE</b>	<b>Headquarters; Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>
<b>TASK FORCE FALCON</b>	<b>Headquarters; Kosovo, Yugoslavia</b>
<b>V CORPS HEADQUARTERS</b>	<b>Headquarters; Heidelberg, Germany</b>
<b>3RD CORPS SUPPORT COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Wiesbaden, Germany</b>
<b>1ST INFANTRY DIVISION</b>	<b>Headquarters; Wuerzburg, Germany</b>
<b>1ST ARMORED DIVISION</b>	<b>Headquarters; Wiesbaden, Germany</b>
<b>SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCE (SETAF)</b>	<b>Headquarters; Vicenza, Italy</b>
<b>21st THEATER SUPPORT COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Kaiserslautern, Germany</b>
<b>7TH ARMY TRAINING COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Grafenwoehr, Germany</b>
<b>5TH SIGNAL COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Mannheim, Germany</b>
<b>1ST PERSONNEL COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Schwetzingen, Germany</b>
<b>266th FINANCE COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Heidelberg, Germany</b>
<b>EUROPE REGIONAL MEDICAL COMMAND</b>	<b>Headquarters; Heidelberg, Germany</b>

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## APPENDIX F. UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (USAFE)

<b>Headquarters U.S. Air Force in Europe Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe</b>	<b>Ramstein AB, Germany</b>
<b>THIRD AIR FORCE:</b>	
<b>100<sup>th</sup> Refueling Wing 352<sup>nd</sup> Special Operations Group 95<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Squadron 488<sup>th</sup> Intelligence Squadron 627<sup>th</sup> Air Mobility Support Squadron</b>	<b>RAF Mildenhall, UK</b>
<b>423<sup>rd</sup> Air Base Squadron</b>	<b>RAF Molesworth, UK</b>
<b>48<sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing</b>	<b>RAF Lakenheath, UK</b>
<b>Air Force Regional News Bureau-United Kingdom 5<sup>th</sup> Space Surveillance Squadron</b>	<b>RAF Feltwell</b>
<b>86<sup>th</sup> Airlift Wing 32<sup>nd</sup> Air Operation Group</b>	<b>Ramstein AB, Germany</b>
<b>52<sup>nd</sup> Fighter Wing</b>	<b>Spangdahlem AB, Germany</b>
<b>4<sup>th</sup> Air Support Operations Group</b>	<b>Heidelberg AIN, Germany</b>
<b>SIXTEENTH AIR FORCE:</b>	
<b>16<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing 31<sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing 31<sup>st</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing</b>	<b>Aviano AB, Italy</b>
<b>39<sup>th</sup> Wing 39<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wing</b>	<b>Incirlik, Turkey</b>
<b>OTHERS:</b>	
<b>469<sup>th</sup> Air Base Group 726<sup>th</sup> Air Mobility Squadron Detachment 1, U.S. Air Forces in Europe Air Postal Squadron 16<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Support Squadron</b>	<b>Rhein-Main AB, Germany</b>
<b>HQ 21<sup>st</sup> TAACOM Staff Weather Office</b>	<b>Boeblingen, Germany</b>
<b>Operational Weather Squadron</b>	<b>Sembach AB, Germany</b>
<b>496<sup>th</sup> Air Base Squadron</b>	<b>Moron AB, Spain</b>
<b>426<sup>th</sup> Air Base Squadron</b>	<b>Sola Sea AB, Norway</b>
<b>152<sup>nd</sup> Air Operations Group (National Guard)</b>	<b>Hancock Field, NY</b>

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**APPENDIX G. UNITED STATES NAVY IN EUROPE  
(USN)**

<b>Commander U.S. Naval Activities</b>	<b>London, England</b>
<b>Naval Station Rota</b>	<b>Rota, Spain</b>
<b>Naval Support Activity La Maddalena</b>	<b>La Maddalena, Italy</b>
<b>Naval Support Activity Gaeta</b>	<b>Gaeta, Italy</b>
<b>Naval Support Activity Naples</b>	<b>Naples, Italy</b>
<b>Naval Support Activity Souda Bay</b>	<b>Souda Bay, Greece</b>
<b>Naval Air Station Sigonella</b>	<b>Sigonella, Italy</b>



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## **APPENDIX H. DECLARATION OF LAEKEN**

### **I. EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS**

For centuries, peoples and states have taken up arms and waged war to win control of the European continent. The debilitating effects of two bloody wars and the weakening of Europe's position in the world brought a growing realization that only peace and concerted action could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come true. In order to banish once and for all the demons of the past, a start was made with a coal and steel community. Other economic activities, such as agriculture, were subsequently added in. A genuine single market was eventually established for goods, persons, services and capital, and a single currency was added in 1999. On 1 January 2002 the euro is to become a day-to-day reality for 300 million European citizens.

The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defense policy.

The European Union is a success story. For over half a century now, Europe has been at peace. Along with North America and Japan, the Union forms one of the three most prosperous parts of the world. As a result of mutual solidarity and fair distribution of the benefits of economic development, moreover, the standard of living in the Union's weaker regions has increased enormously and they have made good much of the disadvantage they were at.

Fifty years on, however, the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. The unification of Europe is near. The Union is about to expand to bring in more than ten new Member States, predominantly Central and Eastern European, thereby finally closing one of the darkest chapters in European history: the Second World War and the ensuing artificial division of Europe. At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first took the lead.

The democratic challenge facing Europe

At the same time, the Union faces twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders.

Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the Union's broad aims, but they do not always see a

connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action. They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also feel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in matters by their nature better left to Member States' and regions' elected representatives. This is even perceived by some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny.

#### Europe's new role in a globalized world

Beyond its borders, in turn, the European Union is confronted with a fast changing, globalized world. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights. Just a few years later, however, there is no such certainty. The eleventh of September has brought a rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them.

What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries, which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.

Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalized, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalization. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalization within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.

#### The expectations of Europe's citizens

The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes. There have been frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones. Citizens also want results in the fields of employment and combating poverty and social exclusion, as well as in the field

of economic and social cohesion. They want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues which they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together. Just as they also want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defense, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.

At the same time, citizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucratically in numerous other areas. In coordinating the economic, financial and fiscal environment, the basic issue should continue to be proper operation of the internal market and the single currency, without this jeopardizing Member States' individuality. National and regional differences frequently stem from history or tradition. They can be enriching. In other words, what citizens understand by "good governance" is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European super state or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life.

In short, citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, developing a Europe which points the way ahead for the world. An approach that provides concrete results in terms of more jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care. There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to undergo renewal and reform.

## II. CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN A RENEWED UNION

The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organize politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilizing factor and a model in the new, multi-polar world. In order to address them a number of specific questions need to be put.

### A better division and definition of competence in the European Union

Citizens often hold expectations of the European Union that are not always fulfilled. And vice versa - they sometimes have the impression that the Union takes on too much in areas where its involvement is not always essential. Thus the important thing is to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States in the light of the new challenges facing the Union. This can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to assigning new missions to the Union, or to the extension of existing powers, while constantly bearing in mind the equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity.

A first series of questions that needs to be put concerns how the division of competence can be made more transparent. Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three

types of competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States? At what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here? And should we not make it clear that any powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the exclusive sphere of competence of the Member States? And what would be the consequences of this?

The next series of questions should aim, within this new framework and while respecting the "acquis communautaire", to determine whether there needs to be any reorganization of competence. How can citizens' expectations be taken as a guide here? What missions would this produce for the Union? And, vice versa, what tasks could better be left to the Member States? What amendments should be made to the Treaty on the various policies? How, for example, should a more coherent common foreign policy and defense policy be developed? Should the Petersberg tasks be updated? Do we want to adopt a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation? How can economic-policy coordination be stepped up? How can we intensify cooperation in the field of social inclusion, the environment, health and food safety? But then, should not the day-to-day administration and implementation of the Union's policy be left more emphatically to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to the regions? Should they not be provided with guarantees that their spheres of competence will not be affected?

Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a redefined division of competence does not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision for this, regions. How are we to ensure at the same time that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? In the future as well the Union must continue to be able to react to fresh challenges and developments and must be able to explore new policy areas. Should Articles 95 and 308 of the Treaty be reviewed for this purpose in the light of the "acquis jurisprudentiel"?

#### Simplification of the Union's instruments

Who does what is not the only important question; the nature of the Union's action and what instruments it should use are equally important. Successive amendments to the Treaty have on each occasion resulted in a proliferation of instruments, and directives have gradually evolved towards more and more detailed legislation. The key question is therefore whether the Union's various instruments should not be better defined and whether their number should not be reduced.

In other words, should a distinction be introduced between legislative and executive measures? Should the number of legislative instruments be reduced: directly applicable rules, framework legislation and non-enforceable instruments (opinions, recommendations, open coordination)? Is it or is it not desirable to have more frequent recourse to framework legislation, which affords the Member States more room for maneuver in achieving policy objectives? For which areas of competence are open

coordination and mutual recognition the most appropriate instruments? Is the principle of proportionality to remain the point of departure?

### More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union

The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses. However, the European project also derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. The national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project. The declaration on the future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, stressed the need to examine their role in European integration. More generally, the question arises as to what initiatives we can take to develop a European public area.

The first question is thus how we can increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the present institutions, a question which is valid for the three institutions.

How can the authority and efficiency of the European Commission be enhanced? How should the President of the Commission be appointed: by the European Council, by the European Parliament or should he be directly elected by the citizens? Should the role of the European Parliament be strengthened? Should we extend the right of co-decision or not? Should the way in which we elect the members of the European Parliament be reviewed? Should a European electoral constituency be created, or should constituencies continue to be determined nationally? Can the two systems be combined? Should the role of the Council be strengthened? Should the Council act in the same manner in its legislative and its executive capacities? With a view to greater transparency, should the meetings of the Council, at least in its legislative capacity, be public? Should citizens have more access to Council documents? How, finally, should the balance and reciprocal control between the institutions be ensured?

A second question, which also relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should they have a role in areas of European action in which the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?

The third question concerns how we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions in a Union of some thirty Member States. How could the Union set its objectives and priorities more effectively and ensure better implementation? Is there a need for more decisions by a qualified majority? How is the co-decision procedure between the Council and the European Parliament to be simplified and speeded up? What of the six monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union? What is the future role of the European Parliament? What of the future role and structure of the various Council formations? How should the coherence of European foreign policy be enhanced?

How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced? Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further?

Towards a Constitution for European citizens

The European Union currently has four Treaties. The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are currently spread across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.

Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns simplifying the existing Treaties without changing their content. Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?

Questions then arise as to the possible reorganization of the Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty and the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve separating the texts? Could this lead to a distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the other treaty provisions?

Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and to whether the European Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganization might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between Member States in the Union?

### III. CONVENING OF A CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

In order to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible, the European Council has decided to convene a Convention composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union. In the light of the foregoing, it will be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses.

The European Council has appointed Mr V. Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman of the Convention and Mr G. Amato and Mr J.L. Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen.

Composition

In addition to its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention will be composed of 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from

each Member State), 30 members of national parliaments (two from each Member State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. The accession candidate countries will be fully involved in the Convention's proceedings. They will be represented in the same way as the current Member States (one government representative and two national parliament members) and will be able to take part in the proceedings without, however, being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge among the Member States.

The members of the Convention may only be replaced by alternate members if they are not present. The alternate members will be designated in the same way as full members.

The Presidium of the Convention will be composed of the Convention Chairman and Vice-Chairmen and nine members drawn from the Convention (the representatives of all the governments holding the Council Presidency during the Convention, two national parliament representatives, two European Parliament representatives and two Commission representatives).

Three representatives of the Economic and Social Committee with three representatives of the European social partners; from the Committee of the Regions: six representatives (to be appointed by the Committee of the Regions from the regions, cities and regions with legislative powers), and the European Ombudsman will be invited to attend as observers. The Presidents of the Court of Justice and of the Court of Auditors may be invited by the Presidium to address the Convention.

#### Length of proceedings

The Convention will hold its inaugural meeting on 1 March 2002, when it will appoint its Presidium and adopt its rules of procedure. Proceedings will be completed after a year, that is to say in time for the Chairman of the Convention to present its outcome to the European Council.

#### Working methods

The Chairman will pave the way for the opening of the Convention's proceedings by drawing conclusions from the public debate. The Presidium will serve to lend impetus and will provide the Convention with an initial working basis.

The Presidium may consult Commission officials and experts of its choice on any technical aspect which it sees fit to look into. It may set up ad hoc working parties.

The Council will be kept informed of the progress of the Convention's proceedings. The Convention Chairman will give an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling Heads of State or Government to give their views at the same time.



The Convention will meet in Brussels. The Convention's discussions and all official documents will be in the public domain. The Convention will work in the Union's eleven working languages.

#### Final document

The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved.

Together with the outcome of national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions.

#### Forum

In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all citizens, a Forum will be opened for organizations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organizations, academia, etc.). It will take the form of a structured network of organizations receiving regular information on the Convention's proceedings. Their contributions will serve as input into the debate. Such organizations may be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance with arrangements to be established by the Presidium.

#### Secretariat

The Presidium will be assisted by a Convention Secretariat, to be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, which may incorporate Commission and European Parliament experts.

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